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Abstract
Over the last 7 years, there has been an alarming increase in the number of opioid
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The increase has occurred despite
Kentucky’s passage of a prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP) as defined by
House Bill 1 (HB1) in 2012. Following the passage of Kentucky’s PDMP, heroin and
fentanyl surpassed other prescription drugs as the most identified drugs in overdose
deaths in Kentucky. Little is known about how the implementation of a PDMP influences
the overall opioid overdose fatality rate. The purpose of this quantitative research, using a
quasi-experimental design, was to evaluate the relationship between the implementation
of Kentucky’s PDMP and a documented rise in heroin and fentanyl overdose fatalities.
Rational choice theory was the theoretical framework for this study. Data regarding
prescribing rates and opioid mortality rates were collected from an online database
published by the Centers for Disease Control. Interrupted time-series analyses were used
to analyze the data. Regarding prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids, results
indicated that overall opioid fatality rates increased dramatically after the implementation
of HB1. The results of this study provide increased knowledge for policymakers, which
may ultimately lead to a decrease in opioid overdose fatality rates.

Impact of Kentucky’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program on Opioid Overdose
Fatality Rates
by
Robert Douglas

MS, University of Louisville, 2015
BS, University of Louisville, 2008

Doctoral Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Criminal Justice

Walden University
May 2020

Table of Contents
List of Tables .......................................................................................................................v
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... vi
Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study....................................................................................1
Introduction ....................................................................................................................1
Problem Statement .........................................................................................................3
Purpose...........................................................................................................................7
Significance....................................................................................................................8
Rational Choice Theory .................................................................................................9
Research Questions ......................................................................................................11
Nature of the Study ......................................................................................................12
Possible Types and Sources of Data ............................................................................14
Importance of This Study.............................................................................................14
Summary ......................................................................................................................14
Chapter 2: Literature Review .............................................................................................16
Introduction ..................................................................................................................16
Framework ...................................................................................................................19
A Brief History of Opioids ..........................................................................................20
Prescription Opioid Diversion .....................................................................................25
PDMP ..........................................................................................................................27
Unintended Consequences of PDMP ...........................................................................29

i

The Gateway Question: Does Prescription Opioid Addiction Lead to Heroin
Use?..................................................................................................................30
Withdrawal Avoidance ................................................................................................32
Fentanyl........................................................................................................................33
Social Implications.......................................................................................................34
Economic Implications ................................................................................................38
Political Implications ...................................................................................................40
Gap in Literature ..........................................................................................................42
Summary ......................................................................................................................43
Chapter 3: Methodology ....................................................................................................45
Introduction ..................................................................................................................45
Variables ......................................................................................................................46
Research Design...........................................................................................................47
Target Population .........................................................................................................48
Data Analysis Plan .......................................................................................................52
Threats to Validity .......................................................................................................52
Ethical Procedures .......................................................................................................53
Summary ......................................................................................................................53
Chapter 4: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Social
Change ...................................................................................................................55
Introduction ..................................................................................................................55
Data Collection ............................................................................................................56

ii

Results ..........................................................................................................................57
Research Question 1a: Have Opioid Prescribing Rates Decreased After the
Implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? ....................................................... 57
Research Question 1b: Have Arrest Rates for Possession of Heroin and
Synthetic Opioids Increased After the Implementation of
Kentucky’s HB1? ...................................................................................... 58
Research Questions 1d Through 1g ...................................................................... 60
Analysis Methods.................................................................................................. 62
Research Questions 1d Through 1g ...................................................................... 63
Analysis Methods for Objective 1 ........................................................................ 65
Analysis Methods for Objective 2 ........................................................................ 68
Assumptions of Time-Series Analysis .................................................................. 69
Analysis Results .................................................................................................... 70
Analysis Results for Objective 1..................................................................................82
ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate .......................................................................... 82
ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ................................................................... 85
ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids ................................ 88
Analysis Results of Objective 2 ............................................................................ 91
Summary ......................................................................................................................97
Chapter 5: Interpretation, Recommendations, and Implications .....................................101
Introduction ................................................................................................................101
Interpretation of the Findings.....................................................................................105

iii

Limitations .................................................................................................................108
Recommendations ......................................................................................................108
Implications................................................................................................................110
Conclusion .................................................................................................................111
References ........................................................................................................................113
Appendix A ......................................................................................................................125
Appendix B ......................................................................................................................129

iv

List of Tables
Table 1: Data of the Study ................................................................................................ 62
Table 2: Example Data Format for ITS Analysis ............................................................. 68
Table 3. ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables ..................................... 74
Table 4. Data of the Study (Original Scale and Lag 1 Differences) ................................. 77
Table 5. ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables (Lag 1 Differences) ..... 80
Table 6. Results of ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate ...................................................... 83
Table 7. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................... 84
Table 8. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ................................................ 86
Table 9. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................... 87
Table 10. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids ........... 89
Table 11. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................. 90
Table 12. Results of Bivariate Analyses ........................................................................... 93
Table 13. Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests .......................................................................... 94
Table 14. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals .................................................................. 96
Table A1. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ........................................... 125
Table A2. Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests ....................................................................... 125
Table A3. ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals ............................................................... 127
Table B1. Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids ........................................... 130
Table B2. Results of Shapiro-Wilk tests ......................................................................... 130
Table B3. ACFs and PACFs for the residuals ................................................................ 132

v

List of Figures
Figure 1. Yearly prescribing rates for Jefferson County, Kentucky. ................................ 58
Figure 2. Jefferson County arrests for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids. ......... 59
Figure 3. Jefferson County arrests for trafficking heroin and synthetic opioids. ............. 60
Figure 4. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (The dash line represents the occurrence
of the intervention) .................................................................................................... 71
Figure 5. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (The dash line represents the
occurrence of the intervention) ................................................................................. 72
Figure 6. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (The dash line
represents the occurrence of the intervention) .......................................................... 73
Figure 7: Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate ......................... 75
Figure 8. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids .................. 75
Figure 9. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids ....................................................................................................................... 75
Figure 10. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line
represents the occurrence of the intervention) .......................................................... 78
Figure 11. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line
represents the occurrence of the intervention) .......................................................... 78
Figure 12. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (Lag 1
differences) (The dash line represents the occurrence of the intervention) .............. 79
Figure 13. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate (Lag 1
differences) ............................................................................................................... 81

vi

Figure 14. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids (Lag 1
differences) ............................................................................................................... 81
Figure 15. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids (Lag 1 differences) ....................................................................................... 82
Figure 16. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values ........................................ 84
Figure 17. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals ............................ 85
Figure 18. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values ........................................ 87
Figure 19: Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals ............................ 88
Figure 20. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values ........................................ 90
Figure 21: Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals ............................ 91
Figure 22. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids and lag 1 differences of
prescribing rate.......................................................................................................... 93
Figure 23. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids
and lag 1 differences of prescribing rate ................................................................... 93
Figure 24. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of
mortality of opioids) ................................................................................................. 95
Figure 25. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) ................................................................ 95
Figure 26. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1
differences of mortality of opioids) .......................................................................... 97
Figure 27. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1
differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) ......................................... 97

vii

1

Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
The United States is in the midst of an opioid epidemic (United States Department
of Health and Human Services [H.H.S.], n.d.a). Jefferson County, Kentucky is among
Kentucky counties that have been hardest hit by the epidemic. The Kentucky Office of
the State Medical Examiner (n.d.) reported that the most common category of deaths
statewide in 2016 was drug related deaths. Drug related deaths accounted for 35% of all
deaths. Drug related deaths were followed by gunshot wounds at 18.9%, nearly half the
number of deaths caused by drugs. Of those drug-related deaths, opioids were, by far, the
largest class of drugs detected. Opioids accounted for 44.56% of drug-related deaths
followed by benzodiazepines at only 16.44% of drug related deaths statewide in 2016
(Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.).
The Kentucky General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (HB1) in 2012 to reduce
the number of prescription drug related deaths. HB1 defined a Prescription Drug
Monitoring Program (PDMP) as having the purpose of monitoring prescribing habits and
sharing prescription information among health care providers. One expected consequence
of implementing the PDMP was to decrease the amount of prescription drugs available
for diversion to the illicit market and, therefore, decrease the number of prescription drug
related deaths in Kentucky. Little is known about how the implementation of Kentucky’s
PDMP might have affected overdose deaths related to non-prescription opioids,
specifically heroin and synthetic opioids (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).
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This research examines the possibility that recent documented increases in heroin
and synthetic opioid fatality rates are related to the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP.
The target populations for this study was people who were arrested for opioid-related
violations and people who died from opioid-related overdose in Jefferson County,
Kentucky between the years of 2007 and 2017. The findings in this study provide
valuable information to policymakers who are tasked with implementing programs to
address drug related problems. The findings in this study provide policymakers with
valuable information for consideration to spark positive social change. Ultimately, the
implications for positive social change are measured in a decrease in opioid overdose
fatality rates and lives saved.
The purpose of this research was to examine the relationship between the
implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the recent increase in heroin and synthetic
opioid related fatality rates using a rational choice theoretical approach. Current research
indicates that cost, availability and purity of available heroin are the primary drivers of a
decision to switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use (Mars, Bourgois,
Karandinos, Montero, & Ciccarone, 2014; Unick, Rosenblum, Mars, & Ciccarone, 2014).
Although price and availability have been found to be the primary considerations
in making the choice to switch to heroin and synthetic opioid use, withdrawal symptom
avoidance sometimes becomes the primary reason for the choice once a prescription drug
abuser has already become addicted to opioids (Mars et al., 2014). Using these
assumptions, the current study conducts various time series regression analyses assigning
the year 2012, when Kentucky implemented a PDMP, as the primary choice point in time
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and independent variable. In this study, dependent variables measuring overdose fatality
rates were used with the identification of various drugs present at the time of death to
quantify any significant relationships.
Problem Statement
Kentucky is ranked among the top 10 states in the nation for opioid-related
overdose fatality rates (NIDA, 2018). Until recent years, the drug overdose problem in
Kentucky was primarily the result of the misuse of various prescription drugs (Office of
the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). Jefferson County, Kentucky has a problem with opioid
overdose fatalities (Jefferson County Coroner’s Office, 2018). Prescription opioids have
been a major contributor to opioid overdose fatality statistics in Jefferson County,
Kentucky (Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.).
The prescription opioid problem has not, however, been unique to Jefferson
County, Kentucky. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC,
2017), PDMPs have been created to address the prescription drug problem nationwide.
The CDC (2017, para. 3) stated that PDMPs are “among the most promising state-level
interventions” for addressing the prescription drug abuse problem.
In response to Kentucky’s prescription drug overdose problem, the Kentucky
General Assembly passed Kentucky’s PDMP, as defined in HB1 in 2012 (Kentucky
General Assembly, 2012). The intent of Kentucky’s PDMP was to reduce prescription
drug misuse by monitoring prescribing and dispensing practices and sharing information
among prescription drug providers (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).
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Prescription opioids are among the prescription drugs that are monitored by
PDMPs. Opioids are drugs that are either made from the opium poppy plant or created
synthetically in legitimate or clandestine labs (National Institute on Drug Abuse [NIDA],
n.d.). A primary medical purpose for opioids is pain management (NIDA, n.d.).
Prescription opioids have historically played a significant role in the overall prescription
drug overdose problem in Kentucky (Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.).
Prescription opioids present a unique problem for addressing prescription drug misuse
because opioids are not only legitimate and highly effective pain management
medications but they are also addictive and desirable for drug dealers and misusers
(NIDA, n.d.; Volkow, 2014).
Misuse of prescription opioids can ultimately lead to overdose incidents and death
(Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.; Volkow, 2014). Prescription opioids can be
found in the illicit market because they are diverted from licit to illicit use (White, Ready,
& Katz, 2016). For the purpose of this study, prescription opioid diversion will be
narrowly defined as when someone misuses prescription opioids that were prescribed for
someone else.
Despite the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP, overall drug overdose fatality
rates in Kentucky have continued to climb (Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.).
Heroin and synthetic opioid use, primarily fentanyl, appear to be at least partially to
blame for the increase in drug overdose fatality statistics in Jefferson County, Kentucky
(Office of the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). The presence of opioids like heroin and
fentanyl further complicates efforts to decrease drug overdose fatalities. Heroin is an
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illicit opioid that is made from morphine, the natural substance found in the poppy plant
(NIDA, n.d.). Heroin is used as a recreational drug for its intoxicating effects (NIDA,
n.d.).
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that has medical purposes but is also created in
illicit drug labs for illicit use (NIDA, n.d.). Heroin and Fentanyl that are created in
clandestine labs cannot be regulated by PDMPs. An alarming finding for Kentuckians is
that fentanyl, alone or in combination with heroin, was identified in 47% of all drug
overdose fatalities in Kentucky in 2016 (Tilley & Ingram, n.d.).
Morphine was the most detected drug in overdose fatalities by the medical
examiner in 2016. The detection of morphine can indicate either a morphine overdose or
a heroin overdose. Heroin presents as morphine after it is metabolized by the body. This
complicates the true measure of heroin’s effect on the overall opioid overdose fatality
rate because it makes it more difficult to pinpoint the exact drug that caused an overdose
death (Tilley & Ingram, n.d.).
Polydrug use also complicates the exact identification of the lethal drug in an
overdose death. Polydrug use is common in overdose deaths in Jefferson County,
Kentucky (Jefferson County Coroner’s Office, 2018). The Kentucky Medical Examiner’s
Office (n.d.) reports all drugs identified in the individual’s body at the time of death on
the toxicology report.
Kentucky’s HB1 does not attempt to address heroin use or illicitly produced
fentanyl use, only prescription drug misuse. An intended consequence of PDMP
implementation is that the availability of prescription opioids for diversion to the illicit
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market should decrease (White et al., 2016). The resulting lack of prescription opioid
availability for misuse might encourage opioid misusers to make a choice to switch from
prescription opioid abuse to heroin and illicitly produced fentanyl use.
In 2016, during the first Opioid and Heroin Awareness Week, former United
States Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, addressed the opioid epidemic with students at
Madison Central High School in Richmond, Kentucky. Lynch repeatedly claimed during
her visit that heroin addiction is usually preceded by a prescription drug problem.
Specifically, Lynch stated that, “sometimes doctors and family members will recognize
someone’s got a problem with pills and they’ll remove them, they’ll cut them off, and
that is often when people will switch to heroin for the same effect” (WLKY News
Louisville, 2016, 21:18).
Muhuri, Gfroerer, and Davis (2013) provided evidence to support the possibility
of a drug policy creating unintended consequences when they found that there was a
strong relationship between first time heroin users and those who have misused
prescription painkillers. Alpert, Powell, and Pacula (2017) provide another example of
drug policy and unintended consequences in their study concerning the relationship
between the reformulation of OxyContin, a prescription opioid, and heroin abuse.
OxyContin abusers made the choice to switch to heroin and fentanyl when their opioid of
choice, OxyContin, was reformulated making it more difficult to crush the drug for
inhalation or injection, the preferred method of use for OxyContin abusers (Alpert et al.,
2017).
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Purpose
The purpose of this quantitative research was to explore the possible relationship
between the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the subsequent rise in heroin and
synthetic opioid overdose deaths as an unintended consequence of the implementation of
the PDMP. The null hypothesis for this study was that there is no relationship between
the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and
synthetic opioid overdose rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The alternative hypothesis
was that there is a relationship between the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 and the
documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates in Jefferson County,
Kentucky. Through this study, I examined variables related to the supply and demand of
prescription opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids and compared these variables along
with the prescription opioid, heroin, and synthetic opioid overdose rates between the
years of 2007 and 2017. Current literature shows that PDMPs can be successful for
changing physician prescribing habits and for reducing prescription drug overdose
incidents (Finklea, Bagalman, & Sacco, 2014). Little is known, however, about the
possible unintended consequences of implementing PDMPs.
Alpert et al. (2017) researched the effects of the reformulation of OxyContin on
the use of heroin. The researchers found that the reformulation created the unintended
consequence of driving OxyContin misusers to switch to heroin use (Alpert et al., 2017).
In this study, I explored the possible relationship between Kentucky’s PDMP and
heroin and fentanyl overdose fatality rates to determine if Kentucky’s PDMP has had the
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unintended consequence of driving prescription opioid misusers to switch to heroin and
fentanyl use.
A quantitative approach helped to identify and quantify possible relationships
between the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the increase in heroin and fentanyl
overdose fatality rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Time series analyses were
conducted using the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP in 2012 as the independent
variable. Prescription drug overdose fatality rates, heroin and synthetic opioid overdose
fatality rates, and opioid prescribing rates over the identified time period were used as
dependent variables to explore possible relationships from within a rational choice
theoretical framework.
Significance
This study fills a gap in the literature concerning the nature of heroin and
synthetic opioid use in the presence of Kentucky’s PDMP, a policy that was intended to
address prescription drug misuse. This study has the potential to reveal a deadly
unintended consequence of a well-intentioned prescription drug regulation policy. This
study is unique because there is very little current research that attempts to identify and
quantify unintended consequences of PDMPs. Current research related to this study
concerns the effectiveness of PDMPs and the choice variables related to making the
switch from prescription opioids to heroin. There is an abundant amount of literature
explaining these topics as well as the history of prescription opioid and heroin use. There
are, however, very few studies that address the unintended consequences of initiating a
PDMP.
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The current state of heroin and fentanyl overdose fatalities in Jefferson County,
Kentucky calls for a better understanding of what sparked and has driven the epidemic.
The knowledge gained from this study could prove to be valuable for future policymakers
concerned with authoring drug-related policy. The possibility of gaining knowledge in
the area of unintended consequences of drug policy suggests serious positive social
change implications. This knowledge could influence future drug policy considerations
and ultimately save lives.
Rational Choice Theory
Rational choice theory was used as the theoretical framework for the current
study. Rational choice theory posits that humans are rational beings (Beccaria, 1764;
Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Because humans are rational beings, we make rational choices
after weighing the perceived benefits against the perceived consequences of our choices.
The beginnings of rational choice theory can be found in the writing of Cesare
Beccaria (Wright, n.d.). Beccaria wrote concerning the condition of 18th century law and
punishment. According Beccaria (1764), the natural state of man is self-serving and
individualistic. The creation of society caused a need for individuals to give up a degree
of freedom and conform to the will of the society. The surrender of some freedoms is
necessary to gain the benefits of living in a civilized and non-chaotic society. This social
contract creates an environment in which people must weigh the benefits, the natural
desires of individuals, against the consequences, or deterrent factors, of acting contrary to
the laws of society (Beccaria, 1764). Beccaria (1764) further believed that for laws to be
truly deterrent, punishments for violation of the laws should be swift and certain.
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Swiftness and certainty of punishment establishes a stronger psychological link between
the illegal action and the punishment. The psychological link enhances the desired
deterrent effects of punishment (Beccaria, 1764).
Various academic works have included and expanded Beccaria’s ideas. For
example, Jeremy Bentham, who was also concerned with controlling human behavior by
using effective laws and punishment. Bentham also opined that humans are motivated by
the receipt of pleasure and the avoidance of pain (Wright, n.d.). For the purpose of this
study, the pleasure and pain discussed by Bentham are equivalent to the benefits and
consequences of criminal behavior, as discussed by Cornish and Clarke (1986).
From within the framework of rational choice theory, those who perceive that the
benefits of committing a crime outweigh the perceived consequences for committing the
same crime will make the rational choice to commit the act. The opposite is true when the
consequences of committing the crime are perceived to outweigh the benefits of
committing the same crime. When the perceived consequences outweigh the perceived
benefits, crime is avoided (Beccaria, 1764; Cornish & Clarke, 1986).
This study was informed by rational choice theory to examine the possibility that
Kentucky’s PDMP played a part in the dramatic documented increase in the heroin and
fentanyl overdose fatality rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky. If Kentuckians made a
rational choice to switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin and synthetic opioids,
this choice would also be consistent with Skinner’s (1938) operant conditioning theory.
Skinner (1938) explained that behavior can be encouraged through reinforcement
or discouraged through punishment. The decision to switch from prescription opioid
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abuse to heroin and fentanyl use is consistent with both positive and negative
reinforcement The decision to switch to heroin and fentanyl abuse not only constitutes
positive reinforcement due to the desired intoxicating rewards of continuing opioid abuse,
but also negative reinforcement because the decision actively avoids the negative
stimulus of enduring opioid withdrawal symptoms. From within a rational choice
framework, both of the reinforcement stimuli mentioned would be considered benefits of
choosing to switch to heroin and fentanyl abuse.
Research Questions
1. Did the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 change the rate of heroin and fentanyl
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky?
a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of
Kentucky’s HB1?
b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate
after the implementation of HB1?
e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic
opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
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g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between prescribing rates
and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates?
Nature of the Study
The nature of this study was quantitative. Quantitative research is consistent with
understanding relationships between variables. The variables in this research were those
that coincide with the assumptions of rational choice theory. When faced with a choice of
action, rational beings will weigh the benefits against the consequences of their actions
(Cornish & Clarke, 1986). The intoxicating effects are desirable to opioid abusers and
that withdrawal symptoms can be severe (U.S. National Library of Medicine, n.d.;
Volkow, 2014).
After the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP, prescription drug abusers were
possibly faced with the choice to discontinue opioid abuse and suffer opioid withdrawal
symptoms, enter into drug rehabilitation treatment, or change to heroin and fentanyl use
to continue receiving the intoxicating effects of opioids while simultaneously avoiding
severe withdrawal symptoms. A rational choice in this position might be to change from
prescription opioid abuse to heroin and fentanyl use.
Prescribing rates and overdose fatality rates for prescription drugs and heroin and
fentanyl prior to the passage of HB1 provided a baseline for this study. The
implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP, in 2012, was used as the point in time when
prescription opioid misusers might have been encouraged to make the switch to heroin
and fentanyl abuse.
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Changes in the drugs that have been identified in overdose toxicology reports
after the passage of Kentucky’s PDMP indicate a need for identifying and quantifying the
possible interactions and relationships over time between the implementation of
Kentucky’s PDMP and prescription opioid, heroin, and fentanyl overdose fatality rates.
There are limitations when using public arrest records. First, one must consider
the possibility of human error. The truthfulness of the data output relies on many officers
inputting arrest data correctly. This accuracy limitation leads to another limitation when
using public arrest data. There are various types of opioids, and other drugs, for which a
person might be arrested. The Louisville Metro Police Department arrest record database
includes arrests for both possession and trafficking in a controlled substance with no drug
identified. Although these entries are sure to include opioid-related violations, the data
cannot be used in this study due to the lack of opioid identification.
Changes in prescribing rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky also help to explain
possible changes in the availability of prescription opioids for diversion in Louisville,
Kentucky. A time series examination of the opioid prescribing rates and overall opioid
overdose fatality rates in Louisville, Kentucky was conducted to evaluate the possible
existence and strengths of relationships between the passage of HB1, the availability of
prescription opioids for diversion, changes in overall drug overdose fatality rates, and
increases in heroin and fentanyl overdose deaths.
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Possible Types and Sources of Data
1. Opioid prescribing rates obtained from the CDC’s (2018) U.S. Prescribing Rate
Maps.
2. Annual opioid overdose fatality reports from the CDC Wonder database.
3. Arrest data obtained from the Louisville Metro Police Department’s online arrest
database.
Importance of This Study
The importance of this study is found in the positive social change implications.
Understanding the possible negative consequences of drug policy implementation may
help future policymakers to consider these consequences prior to policy implementation.
The prediction of negative unintended consequences could lead to additional funding, for
example, for the inclusion of drug treatment and public education initiatives and
ultimately save many lives.
Summary
Jefferson County, Kentucky has a problem with opioid overdose fatalities. In
2012, Kentucky passed HB1 to address the prescription opioid overdose problem. HB1,
however, did not address opioids such as heroin and synthetic opioids like fentanyl and
other illicitly manufactured opioids. After the passage of HB1, the occurrence of heroin
and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities increased dramatically.
This study was conducted to identify and quantify possible relationships between
the passage of HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid fatality
rates. Supply and demand variables such as opioid-related arrest and prescription rates
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were compared to the opioid-related overdose fatality rates during the time period
between 2007 and 2017. The comparison of these variables helps to explain whether the
implementation of HB1 helped to create an environment conducive to addicts switching
from prescription opioid abuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use.
Furthermore, this research helps to fill the literature gap concerning negative
unintended consequences of PDMP implementation. This research is timely and needed
because the opioid epidemic is widespread and states across the nation are struggling to
create policies that will effectively address the epidemic. There is currently very little
research concerning the unintended negative consequences of PDMP implementation.
To provide a better understanding of the history and current state of opioid use
and abuse, I discuss in Chapter 2 the current literature pertaining to opioids in the United
States, prescription opioid diversion, PDMP, unintended consequences of PDMP
implementation, the gateway question, and motivation for switching from prescription
opioid abuse to heroin use. Additionally, I address the social, economic, and political
implications of the opioid crisis.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The Walden University Library was used to perform the majority of the literature
review research for this study. Databases such as Ebsco and Proquest were accessed
through the Criminal Justice Database on the Walden University Library website. Google
scholar was also used to locate current literature. Most of the literature was located by
researching references listed in the articles found in the databases. Information from
various government websites is also cited.
Key search terms used were opioid, heroin, and PDMP related. Combinations of
the key search terms and words such as history, unintended consequences, gateway, and
others were also used. As mentioned, most of the literature research was done by locating
and searching the references listed in articles found using the key search terms.
Most of the literature referenced in Chapter 2 was published within the current
and past seven years, from 2012 through 2019. Some seminal or more aged literature was
used to clarify topics such as the long-time utilized rational choice theory. Information
from the resources is presented in Chapter 2.
Jefferson County, Kentucky’s drug overdose fatality problem has undergone
dramatic changes in recent years. The early driver of drug overdose deaths was
prescription drug misuse. Now, the synthetic opioid fentanyl, alone or in conjunction
with heroin, has overtaken prescription drugs as the most detected drugs identified in
toxicology reports for overdose fatality victims (Office of the State Medical Examiner,
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n.d.). The sudden and dramatic change followed the implementation of Kentucky’s
PDMP in 2012.
The intent of Kentucky’s PDMP was to decrease the rate of prescription drug
misuse and overdose incidents. A successful PDMP would have the intended positive
consequence of allowing fewer prescription drugs to be available for diversion to the
illicit market (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).
Prescription opioids have been top contributors to the prescription drug overdose
fatality problem prior to and after the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP (Office of
the State Medical Examiner, n.d.). Decreasing the availability of prescription opioids
through PDMP regulation would have left the prescription opioid addict with a choice to
make. Options could have included cessation of opioid abuse and suffering opioid
withdrawal symptoms, entering drug rehabilitation treatment, or switching to an available
substitute for the addict’s drug of choice.
For the prescription opioid addict, any of the choices could be considered rational.
In this research, I examined the possible existence and strengths of relationships between
the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and prescription opioid, heroin, and synthetic
opioid overdose rates before and after the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP using a
rational choice framework. I explored the possible relationships to obtain a better
understanding of the changes that have been documented concerning prescription opioid
overdose fatality rates and the possible substitution choice of heroin and synthetic opioid
use and, ultimately, the dramatic documented rise in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose
fatality rates.
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PDMPs are designed to decrease the availability of prescription drugs for
diversion and misuse (Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). Availability, or the lack
thereof, is one of the primary reasons that prescription opioid users make the switch to
heroin (Alpert et al.,2017; Beletsky, 2018; Fink et al., 2018; Li et al., 2014; Nam, Shea,
Shi, & Moran, 2017). Prescription opioid addicts make the switch to heroin to avoid
withdrawal symptoms when prescription opioids are not available (Alpert et al., 2017;
Cicero, Ellis, Surratt, & Kurtz, 2014; Mars et al., 2014).
It is logical to suppose that Kentucky’s PDMP implementation had the
consequence of forcing prescription opioid addicts to weigh their options and make a
choice about which path to follow in the absence of available prescription opioids. It is
also logical to suppose that many prescription opioid addicts would choose to make the
switch to heroin and synthetic opioids to avoid withdrawal symptoms and continue
receiving the desired intoxicating effects of opioid misuse. Finally, following this
reasoning, I explored the possibility that the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP had
the chilling unintended consequence of driving prescription opioid addicts to heroin and
synthetic opioid use thereby dramatically increasing the heroin, synthetic opioid, and
overall opioid fatality rates.
In the following sections, I discuss the current literature concerning several
related topics. First, I discuss a brief history of opioids and the timeline of events that
created the current opioid epidemic. I then discuss the diversion of prescription drugs as a
driver of the opioid problem that led to the development of PDMP across the nation and
specifically in Kentucky. I examine the gateway question and withdrawal avoidance as
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they are related to the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and the choice to switch
from prescription opioid misuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use. I also discuss the
social, economic, and political implications of the opioid overdose epidemic. Finally, I
describe rational choice theory and how it might help to analyze the recent shift from
prescription opioid abuse to heroin and fentanyl use.
Framework
Rational choice theory explains criminal behavior by considering the justification
used in a decision whether or not to commit a crime. Rational choice theory assumes that
humans are rational beings and that we make the most rational behavioral choices after
weighing the benefits against the consequences of a specific behavior. If the benefits of
an action outweigh the consequences, the rational choice would be to proceed with that
action. If the consequences outweigh the benefits a specific behavior, the rational choice
would be to refrain from the behavior (Beccaria, 1764; Cornish & Clarke, 1986).
Rational choice theory has been applied in studies of drug use. In fact, Cornish
and Clarke (1986) used a study of opioid misuse to help explain the theory. The study
used in Cornish and Clarke’s (1986) book, “The Reasoning Criminal: Rational Choice
Perspectives on Offending,” concerned initiation into opioid misuse. It is clearly
established by the authors of rational choice theory that the theory is an appropriate
theoretical framework for studying the rationale for drug initiation, continuance, and
cessation.
Although the choice to switch from prescription opioids to heroin and illicitly
manufactured synthetic opioids is not a choice of whether to commit a crime but rather a
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choice between two similar crimes, rational choice theory is an appropriate theoretical
framework for this study. For the choice in question, rational actors would still weight the
benefits against the consequences of changing behavior and decide.
From within the rational choice theoretical framework, benefits of switching from
prescription opioid use to heroin and fentanyl might be the avoidance of withdrawal
symptoms, continuing to achieve the state of intoxication gained through prescription
opioid abuse, or even avoiding the social stigma associated with participation in a drug
rehabilitation program. These benefits might be weighed against negative consequences
like, arrest, overdose, and death. While it seems unlikely that a rational person would
choose to initiate heroin and synthetic opioid use with such extreme negative
consequences, it is only necessary for the addict to weigh the near certain benefits against
his or her perception of the probability of the negative consequences occurring. If the
addict does not consider the probability of arrest, overdose, or death to be high enough,
he might consider it a rational choice to proceed with the dangerous activity of heroin and
fentanyl use.
A Brief History of Opioids
Opioids are a broad assortment of drugs that are derived from, or mimic the
effects of, the chemicals naturally found in the opium poppy plant (NIDA, 2018). Opioids
are primarily used in the medical field to manage pain, but they are also used for other
issues like coughing and diarrhea (NIDA, 2018).
In addition to the medical qualities of opioids, they can produce an intoxicated
feeling that can encourage misuse (NIDA, 2018.). People who misuse opioids can obtain
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them through various sources. Prescription opioids can be obtained for misuse through
the diversion of legally prescribed medications to the illicit market. Heroin and synthetic
opioids can be illicitly manufactured in clandestine labs and obtained through personallevel drug transactions. In fact, the overwhelming majority of fentanyl overdose deaths
are attributed to fentanyl made illicitly rather than regulated but diverted prescription
fentanyl (Drug Enforcement Administration [DEA], 2017).
Due to the diverse variety of drugs that are included under the broad canopy of
opioids, they appear in all five schedules of the DEA’s schedule of controlled substances.
Prescription opioids are listed in DEA schedules II through V depending upon their
acceptance for legitimate medical use and propensity for addiction (DEA, n.d.).
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid that has an accepted medical use, but it can also be
manufactured in unregulated clandestine laboratories and sold in the illicit market to
effectively circumvent regulation (DEA, 2017, n.d.). Regulated fentanyl, used for
legitimate medical purposes, is a schedule II-controlled substance due to its accepted
medical purpose and high propensity for addiction (DEA, n.d.). Fentanyl is more potent
than other prescription opioids, heroin, morphine and other synthetic opioids (DEA,
2017; Rothberg & Stith, 2018).
Heroin, a drug for which there is no accepted medical application, is a Schedule I
controlled substance (DEA, n.d.). Both medical use and non-medical misuse of opioids
can cause dependence and addiction (NIDA, n.d.). Addiction and misuse of opioids can
cause unintentional overdose fatalities (NIDA, n.d.). A discussion of the current state of
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the opioid epidemic should begin with a clear understanding of the history of opioids and
opioid addiction in the United States.
Opioid Use in the United States
The general use of opium predates the independence of the United States by
millennia. Research has identified the mention of opium and its intoxicating effects in
ancient writings as far back as 1550 B.C. (Wright, 2011). Opioids have made their way
into the United States through various routes.
Opium and its derivatives have had a pronounced impact on the practice of
medicine throughout American history. From the use of laudanum as a physician’s staple
medication in the 1800s to the current state of opioid overdose fatalities of epidemic
proportion, opioids have occupied a considerable portion of American medical and
addiction history (Aronson, 2011; Tricky, 2018).
Laudanum was created by Paracelsus in the late 1400s to mid-1500s by mixing
opium and alcohol (Aronson, 2011). Laudanum was a staple medication used by
American physicians in the late 1800s (Aronson, 2011). The mixture was used for
various ailments ranging from sleeping aids for restless infants to pain management
(Aronson, 2011; Trickey, 2018).
A widely accepted explanation for 19th century opioid addiction began with a
combination of the isolation of morphine from opium in 1804 and the perfection of the
hypodermic syringe in the mid-1860s (Aronson, 2011: Trickey, 2018). In 1804, a German
scientist named Friedrich Serturner isolated morphine from opium and created a water
soluble, and therefore injectable, form of rapid-acting pain relief (Aronson 2011). More
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importantly, however, for discussions involving historical drug policy is morphine’s use
for various female medical issues (Trickey, 2018). Popular use of morphine in the late
1800s for problems like menstrual cramps and nervous diseases made middle to upperclass White women the leading demographic for opioid addiction where they represented
60% of opioid addicts (Trickey, 2018).
The United States Civil War during the early to mid-1860s has also been credited
with 19th century morphine addiction (Lewy, 2013; Trickey, 2018). Lewy (2013),
explains that the hypodermic syringe gained popularity throughout the Civil War. Civil
War field physicians more commonly used powdered morphine applied directly to open
wounds while physicians practicing away from the battlefield freely administered opium
for pain relief (Lewy, 2013). The two observations by Lewy (2013) contradict the
popular belief that the syringe played an important role in Civil War era opioid addiction.
In fact, Guevremont, Barnes, and Haupt (2018) and Lewy (2013) argued that what we
call addiction today, was referred to as a simple moral weakness, or bad habit, in the
Civil War era and shortly thereafter. Therefore, Lewy (2013) rejected the popular idea
that the phrase “army disease,” documented during and after the Civil War, referred to
morphine addiction caused by exposure to morphine during the Civil War.
There were no laws in the United States to regulate opioids prior to 1909, when
the Pure Food and Drug Act required only that narcotic contents be listed on patent
medicines (Aronson, 2011). Only two years later, the first International Opium
Commission concluded that opium was a known “evil” but failed to enact legislation to
regulate its use (Aronson, 2011).
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The lack of opium regulation changed in the early 1900s with the arrival of
Chinese immigrants. Chinese immigrants brought the practice of opium smoking and the
social tradition of smoking opium in an opium den with them to the United States
(Trickey, 2018). Opium dens in the United States were frequented by Chinese workers
and lower-class White males (Trickey, 2018). Trickey (2018) argues that it is this change
in demographics that led to subsequent regulation of opium in the United States.
According to Trickey (2018) it was much easier politically to push legislation against
Chinese and lower-class White male opium addicts than it was previously, when the
primary opioid addict demographics included mainly upper-class White women and men
returning home from the Civil War. In 1909, a bill was passed that made the importation
of opium prepared for smoking a crime with a penalty of up to two years in prison
(Trickey, 2018).
The Harrison Act of 1914 was the first legislation to restrict the use of opium, and
other narcotics, to medical use only (Aronson, 2011). Much later, during the Reagan era
War on Drugs, harsh sentencing for drug offenders accompanied what appeared to be a
return to class and race-related politics (Trickey, 2018). Trickey (2018) discovered that
today’s opioid addicts are primarily White males and elderly people suffering from
chronic pain from across the spectrum of social class. The tendency to identify the
current opioid epidemic as a medical problem rather than a criminal problem is
reminiscent of earlier days in America when opium use became a criminal issue only
after Chinese immigrants and lower-class individuals became addicted (Trickey, 2018).
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Considering the negative historical experiences with opioids and early legislation
to regulate opium and opioids, it is difficult to imagine that modern physicians could be
misled regarding the negative consequences of opioid use. However, HHS (n.d.a)
explained that in the late 1990s, pharmaceutical companies misled physicians to believe
that opioid pain relievers were not addictive. A simple historical review could have
directed physicians to see beyond the misleading sales pitches of pharmaceutical
companies and predict the oncoming wave of prescription opioid addicts. However,
misguidance by the pharmaceutical companies led to a large increase in prescription rates
for opioids across the United States (HHS, n.d.a).
Many new generation prescription opioid addicts began with a steady supply of
prescription medication. The primary method identified for obtaining prescription opioids
was the diversion of prescription opioids from friends, family, and drug dealers in the
illicit market (White et al., 2016). Poor prescribing habits and the diversion of opioids to
the illicit market have helped to fuel a national prescription opioid crisis that has proven
deadly for numerous Americans (HHS, n.d.a).
Prescription Opioid Diversion
The diversion of prescription opioids was a major driver of the opioid overdose
fatality crisis (HHS, n.d.b; McCabe, West, & Boyd, 2013; Pit et al., 2018). For the
purpose of this study, opioid diversion occurs when prescription opioids are misused
either by someone other than the legally prescribed user or by someone who has a legal
prescription but uses the opioids in a manner inconsistent with the prescription.
Inconsistent uses include actions such as taking a higher than prescribed dosage and
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taking leftover prescription opioids for purposes other than the reason for which the
opioids were prescribed. Researchers have indicated various methods for obtaining
diverted prescription drugs (Gau & Brooke, 2017; White et al., 2016).
Studies have shown that the primary sources for obtaining diverted prescription
opioids are family members and friends (Gau & Brooke, 2017; White et al., 2016).
Doctors and other health care providers are also recognized sources for obtaining
prescription drugs (McCabe et al., 2013; White et al., 2016). Improper prescribing
practices by doctors and other health care providers has contributed to the availability of
prescription opioids that could be diverted to illicit use (Dubois et al. 2016; HHS, n.d.b).
A recent review of the existing literature confirmed that emergency departments were
significant contributors to the diversion and misuse of prescription opioids (Lyapustina et
al., 2017). A recent study of high school seniors revealed that of the 13% of high school
seniors reporting prescription opioid misuse, the majority, 45%, obtained them from an
emergency room physician (McCabe et al., 2013). Other physicians and dentists also
contributed to the obtainment and misuse of prescription opioids by 38.3% and 27.1%
respectively (McCabe et al, 2013).
Pharmaceutical companies misled physicians in the late 1990s to believe that
opioid pain relievers were not addictive (HHS, n.d.b). This information alone makes it
appear that pharmaceutical companies were the main culprits in the prescription opioid
crisis. However, Dubois et al. (2016) identified various recurring individual
characteristics among physicians who had been investigated for improper prescribing
practices. Furthermore, HHS (n.d.b) reported that the majority of opioid prescriptions
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have been written by a small number of doctors. Doctor shopping, visiting multiple
doctors to obtain multiple prescriptions, is another method of acquisition used by
prescription opioid misusers (White et al., 2016; Van Hout, 2014).
Harocopos and Bennett (2015) identified three distinct initiation routes into the
misuse of opioids. All three initiation routes rely on the diversion of prescription opioids
in order to sustain a prescription opioid addiction. First, heroin was a popular drug among
specific subcultures throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Today’s older opioid misusers
tended to have been holdovers from the that era (Harocopos & Bennett, 2015). This first
group began opioid use with heroin but, in the modern era, they shifted to misusing
prescription opioids that were diverted to the illicit market (Harocopos & Bennett, 2015).
Recent initiates were more likely to have begun prescription opioid misuse from the other
two routes, recreational or medical initiation (Harocopos & Bennett, 2015). Regardless of
the initiation route, diversion has clearly played an important role in the current epidemic
of prescription opioid misuse and overdose fatalities (White et al. 2016).
PDMP
Poor prescribing practices, diversion, and abuse of prescription drugs can lead to
addiction, overdose, and, in many cases, death. Prescription drug overdose fatality rates
in the last decade have exposed a need for tighter regulation of prescription drugs.
Prescription drug overdose and fatality rates in the United States have led to the
implementation of PDMPs across the nation. PDMP regulations are implemented at the
state level and they vary by state.
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PDMPs are implemented to address prescription drug misuse in general by
monitoring prescribing and dispensing practices concerning controlled substances.
Theoretically, PDMPs decrease the frequency of poor prescribing habits and the
diversion of prescription drugs to the illicit market (Gau & Brooke, 2017; Kentucky
General Assembly, 2012). PDMPs attempt to control diversion methods such as doctor
shopping and prescription fraud by directing physicians and pharmacists to access
individual patient records regarding the prescribing and dispensing of prescription drugs
(Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).
Prescription opioid overdose fatality rates have been a primary concern in the
implementation of PDMPs. The Kentucky General Assembly (2012) addressed
Kentucky’s prescription opioid overdose problem through the passage of Kentucky’s
HB1. HB1 targeted pain management facilities and provided funding for the upgrade and
operation of the Kentucky All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting (KASPER)
system, Kentucky’s prescription monitoring database and the heart of Kentucky’s PDMP
(Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).
The CDC (2017, para. 3) states that PDMPs are “among the most promising statelevel interventions” for addressing the prescription drug abuse problem. Early literature
on the topic confirms the CDC’s (2017) statement to an extent. Early literature shows that
PDMPs can be successful for changing physician prescribing habits and for reducing
prescription drug overdose incidents (Finklea et al., 2014).
Current literature, however, suggests that PDMPS are not living up to the
“promising” label given to PDMPs by the CDC (Compton, Jones, & Baldwin, 2016;
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Hsien-Chang, Wang, Boyd, Simoni-Wastila, & Buu, 2018; Li, G. et al., 2014; Nam et
al., 2017). Compton et al. (2016) claim only some success for states implementing
thorough initiatives, including PDMPs, to decrease prescription opioid overdose
fatalities. Hsien-Chang et al. (2018) studied prescribing habits and concluded that
PDMPs have not been found to be effective for changing opioid prescribing habits for
non-cancer chronic pain sufferers. Li et al. (2018) found that between the years of 1999
through 2008 overdose fatality rates increased and that fatality rates were actually higher
in states with PDMPs compered to states without PDMPs. Nam et al. (2017) found no
statistical evidence that the existence of a PDMP reduces opioid overdose fatality rates.
One recent study found the disabled and older Medicare recipients to be among
the population achieving limited success in reducing opioid use (Moyo et al., 2017).
Another study was inconclusive but provided evidence of unintended consequences of
PDMP implementation, a primary consideration of the current study (Fink et al., 2018).
Unintended Consequences of PDMP
Two potential unintended consequences of PDMP that have been mentioned in
current literature are the concern over limited access to legitimate prescription drugs for
pain management and the movement of illicit prescription drug activities to neighboring
states (Pit, Humphreys & Brandeau, 2018; Finklea et al., 2014; NIDA, n.d.). Muhuri et al.
(2013) strengthened the argument that drug policy could create unintended consequences
when they found that there was a strong relationship between first time heroin users and
those who have misused prescription painkillers. This relationship adds another angle to
the argument that prescription opioid misusers are willing to substitute heroin and
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synthetic opioids for more expensive and less available prescription opioids. The switch
from prescription opioids to heroin and synthetic opioids might be an unintended
consequence of the implementation of a PDMP that successfully removes divertible
prescription opioids from the illicit market (Compton et al., 2016; Pitt, Humphreys, &
Brandeau, 2018). In fact, in many current studies, the authors elude to the possibility that
PDMPs create the undesirable and unintended consequence of encouraging the move to
cheaper heroin and fentanyl when prescription opioids are unavailable due to the
implementation of a PDMP (Compton et al., 2016; Beletsky, 2018; Fink et al., 2018; Li et
al., 2014; Nam et al., 2017; Pitt et al., 2018).
Alpert et al. (2017) provide another example of drug policy and unintended
consequences in their study concerning the relationship between the reformulation of
OxyContin, a prescription opioid, and heroin abuse. OxyContin abusers made the choice
to switch to heroin and fentanyl when OxyContin was reformulated making it more
difficult to crush for inhalation or injection, the preferred method of use for OxyContin
abusers (Alpert et al., 2017). Recent initiates to heroin use in the qualitative Alpert et al.
(2017) study complained that the earlier form of OxyContin had become increasingly
difficult to find causing many to substitute heroin use for their prescription opioid of
choice, OxyContin.
The Gateway Question: Does Prescription Opioid Addiction Lead to Heroin Use?
Current literature indicates that the modern generation of heroin users is more
likely than not to have initiated opioid misuse through the non-medical use of
prescription opioids (Cicero et al., 2014; Unick et al., 2014). Studies have also shown that
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most heroin users would have preferred to continue using prescription opioids, most
specifically OxyContin, over making the switch to heroin use (Cicero et al., 2014; Mars
et al., 2014; Unick et al., 2014). However, heroin and fentanyl are cheaper and more
readily available than prescription opioids (Cicero et al., 2014; Rothberg & Stith, 2018).
When the cost of prescription opioids was too great or there was a lack of prescription
opioid availability, prescription opioid abusers have accepted heroin as a substitute drug
(Alpert et al., 2017; Rothberg & Stith, 2018).
Many current generation heroin misusers made the switch to heroin after having
already become addicted to prescription opioids (Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014).
At least one study has added the level of purity and type of heroin available to the list of
reasons why some people make the switch and others do not (Mars et al., 2014). The
study was conducted in two cities. The cities were San Francisco, where low-purity black
tar heroin was available but more expensive, and Philadelphia, where high-purity powder
heroin was available at a lower cost (Mars et al., 2014). Although some San Francisco
abusers made the switch, they were more likely to seek treatment rather than initiate
heroin use (Mars et al., 2014). Those in Philadelphia with a high-purity, low cost heroin
option, were more likely to make the switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use
(Mars et al., 2014). Studies indicate that heroin cost, availability, and purity are all
predictors for switching from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use (Alpert et al., 2017;
Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014).
Addiction to prescription opioids generates a need for users to avoid withdrawal
symptoms. The switch from prescription opioid abuse to heroin use has been regularly
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linked to the higher cost and lower availability of prescription opioids and the purity and
availability of heroin (Alpert et al., 2017; Cicero et al., 2014).
Withdrawal Avoidance
The main purpose of the current study was to identify and quantify any possible
relationships with the implementation of Kentucky’s PDMP and a documented increase
in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities. It is important, however, to note that
Van Hout (2014) cited the use of codeine for withdrawal symptom avoidance. Codeine is
considered a “weak” opioid but it is problematic because it is also addictive when
misused and it can be purchased in low dosage without a prescription (Van Hout, 2014).
The substitution of codeine for methadone or heroin for the management of withdrawals
strengthens the idea that opioid addicts will misuse substitute opioids to avoid withdrawal
symptoms (Alpert et al., 2017; Van Hout, 2014). The substitution of codeine for
methadone or heroin is, admittedly, going in the opposite direction by substituting a
weaker opioid for a stronger but unavailable prescription opioid. The focus of this study,
in opposition, concerns the substitution of a stronger unregulated opioid, heroine or
fentanyl, in the absence of prescription opioids.
After having become addicted to prescription opioids, many addicts have found it
difficult to either afford or locate enough prescription opioids to avoid withdrawal
symptoms (Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014). When offered the lower-cost and more
readily available heroin substitute, many have chosen to make the switch to heroin use
(Cicero et al, 2014; Mars et al., 2014).
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Fentanyl
Fentanyl is a synthetic opioid. Synthetic opioids are manufactured in a laboratory
without the use of the opium poppy plant (DEA, n.d.). The medical uses of fentanyl are
typically for the treatment of severe and post-surgical pain (NIDA, 2016). The DEA (n.d.,
para. 4) reports that fentanyl is “50-100 times more potent than morphine and 30-50
times more potent than heroin.” Due to the high potency, fentanyl can be deadly at
relatively low doses (DEA, n.d.).
In a 2008 study, Hall et al. reported that 50% of opioid overdose fatalities in West
Virginia were the result of diverted prescription fentanyl. Prescription opioids are no
longer the primary source for opioid overdose fatalities. Government agencies currently
report that illicitly manufactured fentanyl is the primary source for the majority of
fentanyl-related overdose fatalities (DEA, n.d.; NIDA, 2016).
Illicitly manufactured fentanyl is sold in various forms including powder, spiked
blotters, combined with heroin, as a substitute for heroin, or in the form of tablets that
mimic less potent opioids (NIDA, 2016). Regardless of whether the primary source for
fentanyl is diverted prescription fentanyl or illicitly manufactured fentanyl, fentanyl has
become the most commonly identified drug in toxicology reports in Kentucky (Office of
the State Medical Examiner, n.d.).
Supply and Demand
PDMPs are meant to reduce the supply of prescription opioids available for
misuse (CDC, 2017; Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). If a PDMP has been successful
in reducing the illicit supply of prescription opioids, addicts were forced to make a

34

choice. One option for addicts is to substitute their opioid of choice for another form of
opioid.
The interplay of supply and demand variables could encourage prescription opioid
misusers to make the switch to heroin and fentanyl use. Fewer prescription opioids,
driving the price of diverted prescription opioids up, mixed with a steady supply of
heroin and illicitly produced fentanyl, driving the heroin and fentanyl prices down,
interact with the continuing demand for opioids to make switching to heroin and fentanyl
appear to be the rational choice for prescription opioid misusers.
Social Implications
Current literature discusses multiple social implications of the modern opioid
overdose epidemic. Governments at the state and federal levels have attempted to address
the opioid crisis through legislation. Government legislation has sparked a number of
social concerns for researchers.
Class, Race, and Public Opinion
Public opinion has been somewhat fluid concerning drug use and abuse. Social
class and race appear to have played important roles in defining and addressing drug use
problems. Opioids, in particular, have a long history of class and race-related policy and
legislation. There was no criminalization of opioid use until opium dens, frequented by
Chinese immigrant workers and lower-class Whites, replaced civil war veterans, middle
to upper-class White women, and elderly citizens suffering from chronic pain as the
primary users of opium (Trickey, 2018).
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Trickey (2018) briefly mentioned the tough on drugs policies and harsh
sentencing for predominantly Black and Hispanic drug offenders during the Reagan-era
War on Drugs. McLean (2017) and Trickey (2018) contrasted the criminalization of drug
use for previous generations of addicts with the relaxed view of addiction as a medical
problem for today’s opioid addicts. Today’s opioid addicts are primarily White males and
elderly people suffering from chronic pain. McLean (2017) argued that it has been much
easier to gain political support for anti-drug legislation when the primary group having
been targeted was from minority and lower social statuses.
Pain Management
A common concern in current literature has been the question of whether patients
receive the most adequate treatment for pain as determined by their physician
(Guevremont et al., 2018, Pit et al., 2018). Guevremont et al. (2018) argued that
physicians are better situated than politicians to make treatment decisions based on their
relationships with each individual patient. The researchers also acknowledged, however,
that opioid treatment has the possibility of reaching beyond the intended patient through
diversion thereby creating a broader social problem for which the government might be
better situated to address (Guevremont et al., 2018). The concern for Guevremont et al.
(2018) is that the limitations on physician autonomy for treating the individual patient on
a case-by-case basis results in one size fits all legislative treatment rather than treatment
by physicians, who are already monitored by state medical boards and who are better
situated to make individual treatment decisions.
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Opioid Maintenance Treatment
The primary use for opioids in a medical setting is the management of pain. In
addition to pain management, certain opioids such as methadone and buprenorphine are
used in opioid maintenance treatment for people who are already addicted to opioids
(Guevremont et al., 2018). There is concern that a series of regulations by the federal
government curtails adequate access to maintenance treatment for opioid addicted
patients (Guevremont et al., 2018). Beginning with the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914
and continuing through the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 and the Drug Abuse
Treatment Act of 2000, the United States government has placed limitations on opioid
maintenance use as a treatment for opioid addiction (Guevremont et al., 2018).
Diversion Through Poor Storage and Disposal Practices
Another social concern that has been thoroughly studied is the diversion of
prescription opioids to the illicit market (Dubois et al., 2016; Fujii, et al., 2018; Gau &
Brooke, 2017; White et al., 2016). Current studies indicate that excessive prescriptions
and improper storage and disposal of unused prescription opioids contribute to the
diversion of prescription opioids (Fujii et al., 2018; McDonald, et al., 2017). Fujii et al.
(2018) found that patients have historically been prescribed excessive amounts of opioids
after certain surgeries and that the number of opioids prescribed after surgery varied by
physician. When patients obtain more opioids than needed to complete recovery, it can
result in having leftover opioids that can be easily diverted to illicit use (Fujii et al.,
2018). Many patients with leftover prescription opioids fail to properly dispose of the
excess medication (Fujii et al., 2018; McDonald et al., 2017). The failure to dispose of
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excess opioids contributes to the addiction and overdose epidemic (McDonald et al.,
2017). Fujii et al. (2018) and McDonald et al. (2017) suggest that educating patients on
the need for proper use, storage, and disposal of opioids could lead to improved outcomes
for fighting the diversion of opioids to the illicit market. The findings of the McDonald et
al. (2017) study are particularly troubling because their findings related particularly to
households with children present.
Involuntary Civil Commitment
Many states have enacted legislation that allows the involuntary civil commitment
of addicts for treatment with very little, if any, due process (Bhalla, Cohen, Hupt, Stith, &
Zhong, 2018). The legislation addresses opioid addiction as a medical condition rather
than a criminal choice (Bhalla et al., 2018). Involuntary civil commitment is intended to
separate the addict from illicit sources of opioids and some states provide addiction
treatment while the addict is involuntarily committed (Bhalla et al., 2018). In essence,
involuntary commitment is used to protect addicts from harming themselves by isolating
them from society and providing treatment for their addiction (Bhalla et al., 2018). A
major concern for Bhalla et al., (2018) is the lack of evidence that patients actually
receive effective treatment while involuntarily committed. One reason that this is
exceptionally concerning from a social standpoint is the implication that an addict’s
tolerance to opioids decreases while committed and, when released from involuntary
commitment, the addict is at a higher risk for opioid overdose (Bhalla et al., 2018). This
is one more example of unintended consequences of a well-meaning government
legislation.
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Implications for Addicts Seeking Justice
Fresher (2018) discusses the plight of addicts who seek damages in courtrooms
across the United States but are denied justice due to the “wrongful conduct rule.” The
wrongful conduct rule refers to the notion by judges and juries that addicts are not
entitled to damages because their addiction is, at least in part, due to their involvement in
illegal activity (Fresher, 2018). Unfortunately, many opioid addicts have become
addicted through no fault of their own without having made a single criminal choice
(HHS, n.d.a). Poor prescribing habits fueled by false pharmaceutical company sales
pitches concerning the addictive qualities of modern opioids has led to many patients
having been improperly treated with opioids and having become addicted (HHS, n.d.a).
In these instances, it hardly seems just for patients to be denied the opportunity to receive
damages from those who contributed to their condition. The application of the wrongful
conduct rule appears to be an unjust negative societal implication of the current state of
opioid addiction.
Economic Implications
There is plenty of evidence in current literature to confidently state that the opioid
crisis has resulted in an enormous economic burden in the United States. It is difficult to
report an exact dollar amount of the financial burden created by the epidemic because
various studies use different measures. Common measures have been large increases in
medical care and treatment of opioid addicts (Hollingsworth, Ruhm, & Simon, 2017;
Fudin, 2015; Litton, 2018) Other measures have included lost productivity, costs incurred
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by insurance providers, costs incurred by Medicare and Medicaid, and foreign aid to
curtail opioid production and trafficking.
Overall, it has been estimated that the opioid epidemic has cost the United States
more than one trillion dollars between the years 2001 and 2017 (Litton, 2018). In 2007
alone, the costs were estimated at 55.7 billion dollars (Hollingsworthet al., 2017; Meyer,
Patel, Rattana, Quock, & Mody, 2014). Litton (2018) referenced a report by the nonprofit organization, Altarum, that estimated an additional 500-billion-dollar burden to
come between the years between 2017 and 2020.
Litton (2018) reported that lost earnings and productivity due to overdose deaths
are the largest contributors to the financial burden of the opioid epidemic. The cost of
earnings and productivity loss were estimated at 800,000 dollars per opioid overdose
victim (Litton, 2018). The estimate includes the loss of tax revenue as overdose victims
are removed from the workforce (Litton, 2018).
Healthcare costs were estimated by Litton (2018) to be 215.7 billion dollars
between 2001 and 2017. Medicaid has covered much of the healthcare financial burden
(Litton, 2018). Hollingsworth, et al. (2017) reported that Medicaid covers an average of
5,874 to 15,183 dollars per year on opioid-related health care. Medicare was the primary
payer for heroin overdose victims and Medicaid was the primary payer for prescription
opioid overdose victims between 2001 and 2012 (Hsu, McCarthy & Stephens, 2017).
During the time period between 2001 and 2012 prescription opioid overdose victims
presented a larger financial burden, in part due to the fact that heroin overdose victims
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were more likely to have left the healthcare facility against medical advice (Hsu et al.,
2017).
Financial aid provided to the states by the federal government has also contributed
to the financial burden as a result of the opioid overdose epidemic. In 2016, Congress
passed the Century Cures Act and it was signed by President Obama to provide financial
assistance to states for the purposes of primary and secondary prevention measures
between 2016 and 2018 (Sarpatwari, Sinha & Kesselheim, 2017).
In addition to state funding, the federal government also provides financial
assistance to foreign countries to help combat the trafficking of opioids and other illicit
drugs into the United States (Felter, 2017). According to Felter (2017), The United States
has provided almost three-billion-dollars to Mexico, and an additional near ten-billiondollars to Colombia to combat the illicit drug trade that funnels opioids and other drugs
into the United States.
Political Implications
The opioid overdose epidemic has certainly entered the realm of U.S. politics.
Politicians and voters are using the issue to campaign and make political choices
respectively (Gibson, 2018; Smith, 2018). Political candidates from both sides of the aisle
are using the issue to gain political favor (Gibson, 2018). Both Republicans and
Democrats seeking office have taken a stand in one way or another in the fight to reduce
opioid abuse and overdose fatalities (Gibson, 2018). The primary difference between
Republican and Democrat parties has been said to be the way in which each party sees
the appropriate response to the epidemic (Gibson, 2018; McDonough, 2016; Smith,
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2018). Republicans have sought a law enforcement approach while Democrats have
sought a treatment-based approach (Gibson, 2018; McDonough, 2016; Smith, 2018).
Just prior to the 2018 midterm elections, President Trump claimed a bipartisan
victory after signing legislation that would address the opioid epidemic with an additional
six-billion dollars to increase both law enforcement efforts, historically promoted by the
right, and access to medical treatment for opioid addiction, historically promoted by the
left (Jackson & Fritze, 2018).
Research has suggested that there are underutilized alternatives to opioids for
effective pain management (Atkinson, Schatman, & Fudin, 2014; Dennenberg & Curtiss,
2016; Lipman, 2015). Atkinson et al. (2014), Dennenberg and Curtiss (2016), and
Lipman (2015) advocate the education of healthcare providers on the existence and
effectiveness of the pain treatment alternatives. Atkinson et al. (2014) and Dennenberg
and Curtiss (2016) discuss alternative treatments such as acupuncture and massage that
are not typically covered by insurance companies. Lipman (2015) discusses the
alternatives of psychology and physical therapy that are also not always covered by
insurance providers. Lipman (2015) further points out the relationships between
insurance companies and their lobbying and financial political support for politicians as
an additional barrier to alternative treatment coverage.
In contrast to the messages surely conveyed through lobbying and financial
support from insurance companies, Guy (2018) encourages Congress to mandate
treatment coverage for opioid addiction. Guy (2018) explains that Congress has the
authority to enact such legislation through the Necessary and Proper Clause and the
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Taxing and Spending Clause of the Affordable Care Act (ACA). According to Guy
(2018), the mandated coverage of opioid addiction treatment by insurance companies is a
way to get to the root of the opioid misuse and overdose problem.
McCoy and Kanter (2018) researched the financial relationships between
pharmaceutical firms that have been investigated for contributing to the opioid epidemic
and congressional members of the political action committees primarily responsible for
addressing the opioid epidemic. Not surprisingly, the researchers found substantial ties
between committee members and campaign contributions from the firms being
investigated by state and federal officials (McCoy & Kanter, 2018). Clearly, the
campaign contributions create an obstacle for Congressional action that might affect the
profitability of these firms.
Gap in Literature
There is a substantial amount of literature dedicated to opioids and the current
opioid overdose fatality epidemic. The body of knowledge is currently increasing at a
rapid rate due to the urgency of the crisis. The available literature undoubtedly describes
the history of opioid use, abuse, and addiction in the United States. Opioid misuse can
lead to addiction and researchers have found that opioid addicts are willing to switch
from prescription opioid misuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use for various reasons.
Reasons include cost, availability, purity, and withdrawal symptom avoidance. Current
literature has also thoroughly covered the broad topics of legislation intended to decrease
opioid overdose fatalities and some of the unintended consequences of such legislation.
Kentucky’s PDMP is one example of the types of legislation intended to decrease the
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prescription opioid fatality rate. Kentucky’s PDMP was defined in HB1 in 2012. The
heroin and fentanyl overdose fatality rates increased rapidly after the passage of HB1.
The gap in the literature that was addressed in the current study relates to the
identification and quantification of possible relationships between the implementation of
Kentucky’s PDMP and the documented increase in heroin and fentanyl overdose fatality
rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky.
Summary
Opioid use and abuse have long been a part of American existence (Aronson,
2011; Tricky, 2018). Early uses were primarily medical, but some recreational use was
reported in opium dens (Aronson, 2011; Trickey, 2018). Recent history shows a problem
with abuse, overdose, and deaths related to prescription opioids. Much of the problem
with prescription opioids is related to the diversion of prescription opioids to the illicit
market (HHS, n.d.b; McCabe et al., 2013; Pit et al., 2018). PDMPs were implemented
across the United States to monitor prescribing practices and address the problem of
prescription drug diversion (Gau & Brooke, 2017; Kentucky General Assembly, 2012).
Research has shown that prescription opioid abuse is a common precursor to heroin use
(Cicero et al., 2014; Unick et al., 2014). One unintended consequence of PDMP that has
been identified is that prescription opioid addicts will turn to heroin and illicitly
manufactured synthetic opioids when the cost of prescription opioids becomes too high or
when prescription opioids are no longer readily available (Mars et al., 2014). The switch
from abusing prescription opioids to heroin and synthetic opioid use carries with it a
multitude of social, economic, and political implications (Dubois et al., 2016; Fudin,
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2015; Fujii et al., 2018; Gau & Brooke, 2017; Gibson, 2018; Guevremont et al., 2017;
Litton, 2018; McDonald et al., 2017; McLean, 2017; Pit et al., 2018; Trickey, 2018;
Meyer et al., 2014; Smith, 2018; White et al., 2016).
I addressed the gap in the literature by researching the possible relationships
between PDMP implementation in Kentucky with the documented increase in heroin and
synthetic opioid overdose rates. Using the methodology described in Chapter 3 advanced
the knowledge in this area and helped to fill the literature gap.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
Introduction
Chapter 3 includes the methodology that was used to explore the possible
relationships between the passage of HB1 and a documented increase in heroin and
synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates. Discovering and quantifying the possible
relationships was the purpose of this study. In this chapter, I address the research design
and rationale as well as the data analysis, and validity of the study.
In this quantitative study, I used a quasi-experimental research design to identify
and quantify the possible relationships between the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 and a
documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities in Jefferson
County, Kentucky.
Cost and availability of opioids play roles in the decision to switch from
prescription opioid misuse to heroin use (Ciccarone, 2009; Unick et al., 2014).
Kentucky’s HB1 was passed in 2012 with the intent of reducing the availability of
prescription drugs for diversion to illicit use. This research focused on the availability of
prescription opioids, heroin and synthetic opioids, to discover if the supply of both types
of opioids created an environment conducive to encouraging prescription opioid misusers
to choose to make the switch to heroin and synthetic opioid use. With the implementation
of HB1, prescription opioid addicts might have been faced with the choice of stopping
opioid misuse or switching to an available alternative.
First, reviews of LMPD arrest records were conducted to see if the
implementation of HB1 influenced supply and demand related variables. For the purpose
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of this study, supply and demand variables were arrest rates for trafficking and possession
of prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids. Next, an interrupted time series
study was conducted to see if HB1 had the intended effect of reducing prescribing rates
for opioids. Additionally, interrupted time series studies were conducted to see if HB1
influenced death rates for prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids. Finally, an
interrupted time series study was conducted to identify and quantify possible
relationships between prescribing rates and opioid overdose death rates.
Variables
There were five primary objectives for this study. First, prescribing data were
analyzed to reveal whether prescribing rates were reduced, as desired, by the intervention
HB1. Second, opioid overdose fatality rates were analyzed to reveal whether the
implementation of HB1 had an effect on opioid-related fatalities. Third, arrest data were
analyzed to discover the supply and demand conditions for prescription and synthetic
opioids in Jefferson County, Kentucky prior to and after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1.
Fourth, prescribing rates and opioid overdose fatality rates were analyzed to identify
possible relationships. Finally, prescribing rates and supply and demand variables were
analyzed to identify and quantify possible relationships.
Objective one was met using an interrupted time series study in which the
independent variable was time. The year 2012, in which Kentucky’s HB1 was
implemented, acted as the point in time that the intervention, HB1, was introduced. The
dependent variable used for objective one was prescribing rates for Jefferson County,
Kentucky.

47

Objective two was met using an interrupted time series study in which the
independent variable was also time. 2012 again acted as the point in time that the
intervention, HB1, was introduced. The dependent variable for objective two was
prescription opioid overdose fatality rates, heroin overdose fatality rates, and synthetic
opioid overdose fatality rates.
Objective three was also met using an interrupted time series study. Again, time
was the independent variable and 2012 was the point in time when the intervention, HB1,
was introduced. Dependent variables were arrest rates for possession and trafficking of
prescription opioids, arrest records for possession and trafficking of heroin, and
possession and trafficking of synthetic opioids.
Objective four was met using interrupted time series analyses. Opioid prescribing
rates were used as the independent variable. The dependent variables for meeting
objective four were prescription opioid overdose fatality rates, heroin overdose fatality
rates, and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates.
Objective five was met using bivariate regression analyses. Opioid prescribing
rates were the independent variable. The dependent variables for meeting objective five
were arrest records for possession and trafficking of prescription opioids, possession and
trafficking of heroin, and possession and trafficking of synthetic opioids.
Research Design
I used interrupted time series studies to identify possible effects of the
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. The years prior to 2012 established a baseline for
comparison. The comparison clarified trends prior to and following 2012, the year that
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Kentucky’s HB1 was passed into law. The interrupted time series analysis was used
because it allowed for the isolation of the year 2012 as a point in time when the
independent variable, HB1, was introduced to the population of Kentucky. I was
interested in the possible changes among dependent variables related to the heroin and
synthetic opioid crisis in Jefferson County, Kentucky. The dependent variables were
related to opioid availability, prescription opioid overdose fatality rates, and heroin and
synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates over the time period between 2007 and 2017. The
10-year range includes the 5 years prior to and 5 years after the passage of HB1. The 10year period included sufficient time before and after the introduction of HB1 to identify
any pre-HB1 trends to be compared with post-HB1 trends. Identification of trends helped
to understand the possible relationships between the passage of HB1 and the recent
documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates.
Target Population
Inclusion in this study was based on inclusion in various publicly available
databases. Each database focuses on the geographical area of Jefferson County,
Kentucky.
The availability of both prescription opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids was
measured using the Louisville Metro Police Department’s arrest records database. The
database is available on the Louisville Metro Police Department public website. Arrest
record data was helpful with understanding both the availability of and demand for illicit
prescription opioids and heroin and other synthetic opioids.
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The target population for primary objective one of this study, determining the
supply and demand environment in Jefferson County, Kentucky before and after the
passage of HB1, was drawn from the Louisville Metro Police Department web page,
https://data.louisvilleky.gov/dataset/crime-reports. Each year was selected and filtered to
reveal arrests for the following violations:
•

Importing Heroin

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree - 1st Offense - Heroin

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance - 1st Degree – 2nd Offense - Heroin

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 3rd or > Offense - Heroin

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st Offense - Opiates

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance – 2nd Offense – Opiates

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance-1st Degree 3rd or > Offense – Opiates

•

Possession of a Controlled Substance – 2nd Degree - Codeine

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st Offense (< 10 DU Opiates)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – (> or = 10 DU Opiates)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree -1st Offense - Heroin (> or = 2
Grams but < 100G)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st Offense (< 2 Grams Heroin)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (< 2 Grams Heroin)
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•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (> or = 2
Grams - Heroin)

•

Aggravated Trafficking in a Controlled Substance - 1st Degree (> or = 100 Grams
- Heroin)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (< 10 DU
Opiates)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd or > Offense (> or = 10 DU
Opiates)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 2nd Degree-1st Offense (> or = 10 DU
Codeine)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – -2nd Degree – 1st Offense (< 10 DU
Codeine)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 2nd Degree – 2nd or > Offense (> or = 10 DU
Codeine)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 1st offense (< 2 Grams
Fentanyl)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance – 1st Degree – 2nd Offense or > (> Or = 2
Grams - Fentanyl)

•

Trafficking a Controlled Substance –, 1st Degree – 2nd Offense or > (< 2 Grams
Fentanyl)
The target population for primary objective two of this study, determining and

quantifying possible relationships between the passage of HB1 and a documented
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increase in heroin and synthetic opioids, was people who have died in Jefferson County,
Kentucky due to opioid-related overdose. The sample was drawn from CDC archives
found at https://www.wonder.cdc.gov. The “Multiple Causes of death (Detailed
Mortality)” link listed under the heading “Mortality” was clicked to open a page
containing search by date options. The data request link in the “1999-2017” category was
clicked, and the terms of use agreement page was activated.
For section one, the group results were filtered by state and county. For section
two, the state of Kentucky was highlighted, and the “open” button selected to reveal and
select “21111 (Jefferson County, KY).” All categories remained selected in the 2013
Urbanization selection box. For section three, all categories remained with the default
selections of “All Ages,” “All Genders,” “All Origins,” and “All Races.”
There were multiple entries for section four due to the fact that there were
multiple years examined in this study. The individual years from 2007 through 2017 were
input into section four to obtain a data set for each year.
The section five boxes remained with their default selections of “All Weekdays,”
“All Values,” and “All Places.” For section six, the “UCD – ICD-10 Codes” radio button
and “*All* (All Causes of Death) remained selected.
Section seven was changed several times to include the various categories of
opioids as the cause of death. The values of T-40.0 (Opium), T-40.1 (Heroin), T-40.2
(Other Opioids), T-40.3 (Methadone), T-40.4 (Other Synthetic Narcotics) were used
individually in separate searches to obtain data for the various opioid-related causes of
death for each year included in this study.
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Data Analysis Plan
SPSS was used to employ interrupted time series analyses. Prescribing rates for
Jefferson County, Kentucky, as reported by the CDC’s (n.d.) U.S. Opioid Prescribing
Rate Maps, were entered into SPSS along with prescription opioids death rates and heroin
and synthetic opioid death rates. Interrupted time series analyses quantified possible
relationships between the prescribing rates and opioid mortality rates.
Opioid death statistics for Jefferson County Kentucky were further entered into
SPSS to quantify possible effects of implementing Kentucky’s HB1. Data were collected
from the online database published by CDC Wonder (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, n.d.). The analyses measured the possible effects that the intervention, HB1,
had on opioid prescribing rates as well as prescription opioid and heroin and synthetic
opioid overdose fatality statistics. Opioid overdose fatality rates for the years between
2007 and 2017 were entered to indicate changes in fatality rates after the passage of
HB1and infer possible relationships between both variables.
Threats to Validity
Although attempts were made to include all pertinent data into this study, it was
unavoidable that some data were missing. This lack of data could pose a significant threat
to the validity of objective one in this study. The dataset that was compiled for objective
one of this study comes from published police arrest statistics. While this might be a valid
way to collect data concerning the supply and demand for specific drugs, the database is
lacking in some ways. First, the data only measure the number of people who were
charged with one of the multiple crimes indicating a supply or demand for opioids. The
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data set fails to recognize the multitude of people who are never arrested or charged with
violating the statutes. Furthermore, some of the charges listed in the data set are vague.
This vagueness makes it impossible to determine an exact number for each violation of
law concerning opioids. For example, there are many people charged with Possession of
a Controlled Substance. This leaves out the indication of which type of controlled
substance that was allegedly possessed. Therefore, the statistics for these charges must be
left out of the current study.
Ethical Procedures
All data were collected from publicly accessible website databases. No personal
identification of anyone included in the sample can be made using the data included in
this study. The Louisville Metro Police Department webpage contains both the date of
arrest and address of arrest. Date of arrest and address of arrest could arguably be used to
narrow identification of arrested subjects, but this data will not be included in the current
study.
Summary
I explored the possible relationships between the passage of HB1 and recent
documented increases in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose deaths.
This research was guided by the following research questions:
1. Did the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 change the rate of heroin and fentanyl
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky?
a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of
Kentucky’s HB1?

54

b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate
after the implementation of HB1?
e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic
opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between prescribing rates
and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates?
I used quantitative time series analyses methods to explore the possible relationships.
All data were collected from publicly accessible website databases that do not contain
personal identifiable information. The results of this study can be used to guide future
drug legislation and avoid unintended consequences that may prove deadly for a large
portion of the population. The positive social implication for this study is that the results
could ultimately save lives.

55

Chapter 4: Application to Professional Practice and Implications for Social Change
Introduction
The purpose of this study was to identify and quantify the possible relationships
between the passage of HB1 and a documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid
overdose fatalities. The research was guided by the following research questions:
1. Did the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 change the rate of heroin and fentanyl
overdose fatalities in Jefferson County, Kentucky?
a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of
Kentucky’s HB1?
b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased
after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate
after the implementation of HB1?
e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic
opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between prescribing rates
and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates?
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The null hypothesis for this study was that there is no relationship between
Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose
rates. The alternative hypothesis was that there is a significant relationship between the
passage of Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid
overdose rates. In Chapter 4, I outline the data collection procedures and results of the
analyses. I describe the collection of secondary data for this study and discuss the
analyses conducted for each research question, as well as the results of the individual
analyses.
Data Collection
There were three sources for the data used in this study. First, data concerning
opioid prescribing rates for Jefferson County, Kentucky were drawn from the CDC’s
(n.d.) U.S. Opioid Prescribing Rate Maps. The CDC reports prescribing rate data for the
years of 2006 through 2017. I used data from 2007 through 2017.
Second, data concerning arrests for possession and trafficking of opioids were
drawn from the Louisville Metro Police Department’s (LMPD, n.d.) crime reports.
LMPD reports arrest data between the years of 2003 through 2019. I used arrest data
from 2007 through 2017.
Finally, data concerning opioid overdose fatalities were drawn from the CDC
(n.d.) Wonder database. The database houses information about fatalities in the U.S.
CDC Wonder database searches can be filtered to pinpoint specific causes of death. I
used opioid overdose fatality data from 2007 through 2017.
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All three databases are available to the general public on the Internet. No
demographic information, such as age or sex, were used in this study. I was concerned
with statistical significance between a specific public policy and overall fatality rates.
Therefore, no demographic data was needed.
The population for this study included all residents of Jefferson County, Kentucky
during the years from 2007 to 2017. The mandates in HB1 apply equally to all residents
of Kentucky. To be included in this study, residents of Jefferson County must have either
died from an opioid overdose or been arrested for possession or trafficking of opioids.
Results
Research Question 1a: Have Opioid Prescribing Rates Decreased After the
Implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
A visual inspection of the related data revealed that there was a decrease in opioid
prescribing rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky after the implementation of HB1. As can
be seen in Figure 1, opioid prescribing rates in Jefferson County, Kentucky peaked in
2008 with 136.5 prescriptions per 100 U.S. residents. This statistic indicates that some
Jefferson County residents received multiple opioid prescriptions throughout 2008. The
number of residents receiving prescriptions is not clear because the CDC only reports the
overall prescription rate. It is also unclear how many prescriptions, on average, each
patient received. Prescribing rates had begun to decrease in 2011 but not as dramatically
as in 2012, the year that HB1 was implemented, and the following years. Opioid
prescribing rates continued to decrease following the passage of HB1 in 2012. Opioid
prescribing rates have decreased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. The opioid
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prescribing rate in Jefferson county initially decreased from 130.8 prescriptions per 100
U.S. residents to 114.3 prescriptions per 100 U.S. residents in 2012. The downward trend
slowed but continued from 2012 through 2017, when the prescribing rate in Jefferson
County was 76.5 prescriptions per 100 U.S. residents.

Figure 1. Yearly prescribing rates for Jefferson County, Kentucky.
Research Question 1b: Have Arrest Rates for Possession of Heroin and Synthetic
Opioids Increased After the Implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
As can be seen in Figure 2, arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic
opioids peaked in 2016 with 1381 arrests. Arrest rates had shown an increase but had
remained relatively stable between 2007 and 2011. The arrest rate for possession of
heroin and synthetic opioids increased from 107 arrests in 2006 to 436 in 2012, the year
that HB1 was implemented. The arrest rate continued to increase until it peaked at 1,381
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arrests in 2016. This increase indicates a dramatic rise in demand for heroin and synthetic
opioids beginning in 2012, the year that HB1 was implemented.

Figure 2. Jefferson County arrests for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids.
Research Question 1c: Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic
opioids increased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1?
As can be seen in Figure 3, trafficking in heroin and synthetic opioids peaked in
2016 with 372 arrests. Prior to 2012 the arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic
opioids increased slightly but remained relatively stable. The arrest rate for trafficking of
heroin and synthetic opioids in Jefferson County, Kentucky increased from 46 arrests in
2011 to 147 arrests in 2012, the year that HB1 was implemented. Arrest rates for
trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids continued to increase from 147 arrests in 2012
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until the arrest rate peaked in 2016 at 372 arrests. This increase indicates a rise in supply
of heroin and synthetic opioids in Jefferson County, Kentucky beginning in 2012.

Figure 3. Jefferson County arrests for trafficking heroin and synthetic opioids.
Research Questions 1d Through 1g
For research questions 4 through 7, data of three variables from 2007 to 2017 (See
Table 1) were retrieved from the CDC.
•

Prescribing rate: Prescribing rate contains data that was collected from the CDC
prescribing rate maps at https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/maps/rxratemaps.html . The prescribing rate represents retail opioid prescriptions dispensed
per 100 persons per year.
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•

Mortality of opioids: Mortality of prescription opioids contains data from the
CDC Wonder database concerning the number of prescription opioid deaths per
year in Jefferson County, Kentucky.

•

Mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids: Mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids contains data from the CDC Wonder database concerning the number of
heroin and synthetic opioid deaths per year in Jefferson County, Kentucky.

Note that the intervention, Kentucky’s HB1, was passed in February of 2012.
The purpose of research questions 4 through 7 was two-fold. First, to determine
the effect of the intervention on the three outcome measures (Prescribing rate, mortality
of opioids, and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids; Objective 1). Second, to
determine the relationships between the two mortality measures (mortality of opioids and
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) and prescribing rate (Objective 2).
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Table 1.
Data of the Study
Year

Prescribing

Mortality of

Mortality of heroin and synthetic

rate

opioids

opioids

2007

125.2

0

0

2008

136.5

11

0

2009

131.8

18

0

2010

133.3

19

0

2011

130.8

52

12

2012

114.3

41

37

2013

96.8

34

62

2014

95.5

39

39

2015

88.5

27

87

2016

83.4

54

177

2017

76.5

69

275

Analysis Methods
Research questions 1a through 1c were analyzed by simply reviewing the data listed
in the CDC’s (n.d.) prescribing rate maps and the LMPD online arrest database. Research
questions 1a through 1c are as follows:
1a. Have opioid prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of Kentucky’s
HB1? Research question 1a was analyzed by reviewing the CDC’s (n.d.) prescribing
rate maps.
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1b. Have arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after the
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? Research question 1b was analyzed by
reviewing the LMPD’s (n.d.) arrest statistics for the years of 2007 through 2017.
1c. Have arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after the
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1? Research question 1c was also analyzed by
reviewing the LMPD’s (n.d.) arrest statistics for the years of 2007 through 2017.
Research Questions 1d Through 1g
Data were imported into and analyzed using SPSS version 23 for Windows (IBM
Corp., Armonk, NY). Time-series analysis is used when observations are made
repeatedly over a period of time. The time series model used in this study was autoregressive, integrated, moving average, called ARIMA (p, d, q) model. The autoregressive element, p, represents the lingering effects of the preceding scores. The
integrated element, d, represents trends in the data, and the moving average element, q,
represents the lingering effects of preceding random shocks (Yaffee and McGee, 2000;
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).
Time series may be stationary or nonstationary (Yaffee and McGee, 2000).
Nonstationary series have systematic trends (ex: linear and quadratic), while a stationary
process has a constant mean and variance over the time period of the study (Tabachnick
and Fidell, 2013). For ARIMA models, the time series need to be stationary (Yaffee and
McGee, 2000). The middle element, d, should hence be investigated before p and q. The
goal is to determine if the process is stationary and, if not, to make it stationary before
determining the values of p and q. For each study variable (Prescribing rate, mortality of
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opioids, and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids), stationarity was examined by
investigating the figure of the sequence over the time period, and the figures of
autocorrelation functions (ACFs) and partial autocorrelation functions (PACFs).
Autocorrelations are self-correlations of the series of scores with itself, removed one or
more periods in time (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). In other words, the ACF show the
correlation in a series between one observation and another observation in the same series
k lags away (Yaffee and McGee, 2000). Partial autocorrelations are self-correlations with
intermediate autocorrelations partialed out (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). The PACF,
when working at k lags, controls for the confounding autocorrelations in the intermediate
lags, with the purpose of partial out those autocorrelations, leaving only the
autocorrelation between the current and kth observation (Yaffee and McGee, 2000).
If a series is stationary, the line of the sequence over the time period will be
basically horizontal with constant variance and the magnitude of the autocorrelation
attenuates fairly rapidly, whereas if the series is nonstationary, the line will not be
horizontal with constant variance and the autocorrelation diminishes gradually or
demonstrates wild fluctuation before it drops below the level of significance (Yaffee and
McGee, 2000; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013; IBM Corp., 2015). Differencing (i.e.,
subtracting the value of an earlier observation from the value of a later observation) was
undertaken if the time series was not stationary (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013). For
nonstationary series, d-values of 1 or 2 are usually adequate to make the mean stationary
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).
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The basic processes of the ARIMA (p, d, q) model include the autoregressive
process (p), the integrated process (d), and the moving average process (q). After
ensuring the series are stationary, the next step is identification in which ACFs and
PACFs are examined to see which of the potential patterns are present in the data for the
autoregressive process and the moving average process (Yaffee and McGee, 2000;
Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013; IBM Corp., 2015). The general guidelines for identifying
the process are:
•

Autoregressive processes have an exponentially declining ACF and spikes in the
first one or more lags of the PACF. The number of spikes indicates the order of
the autoregression (p).

•

Moving average processes have spikes in the first one or more lags of the ACF
and an exponentially declining PACF. The number of spikes indicates the order of
the moving average (q).

•

Mixed processes typically show exponential declines in both the ACF and the
PACF.
In addition to the guidelines for identifying the ARIMA processes, the Expert

Modeler modeling procedure in SPSS (IBM Corp., 2015) was used to find the initial best
fitting ARIMA model for each dependent series (Penfold and Zhang, 2013).
Analysis Methods for Objective 1
Research questions 1d through 1f. Research questions 1d through 1f were
analyzed using interrupted time series methods. Research questions 1d through 1f are as
follows:
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1d. Is there a statistically significant difference in the opioid prescribing rate after the
implementation of HB1?
1e. Is there a statistically significant difference in the prescription opioid overdose
fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
1f. Is there a statistically significant difference in the heroin and synthetic opioid
overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1?
Interrupted time-series (ITS) analysis (Wagner, Soumerai, Zhang, & RossDegnan, 2002; Penfold and Zhang, 2013) was conducted to determine the effect of the
intervention on the three outcome measures (Prescribing rate, mortality of opioids, and
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) (Objective 1). There were three dependent
variables, including prescribing rate, mortality of opioids, and mortality of heroin and
synthetic opioids, and one independent variable, the intervention. Equation 1 presents the
time series regression equation:
Yt = β0 + β1*T1t + β2*It + β3*T2t + et ……………………………………. (Equation 1)
where
•

Yt is the outcome variable in year t;

•

T1t is a continuous variable indicating time in year at time t from the start of the
observation period (T1 = 1, 2, …, 11);

•

It is an indicator variable equal to 0 before the intervention and equal to 1 after the
intervention;

•

T2t represents time after intervention, equal to 0 before the intervention and equal
to the number of months after the intervention;
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•

The error term et represents the random error not explained by the model,
consisting of normally distributed random error and an error at time t that may be
correlated to errors at preceding time points.
Table 2 presents the example data format for the ITS analysis. Coefficient β0

estimated the yearly value of the outcome variable at baseline (2007); β1 estimated the
baseline slope parameter representing change in the outcome variable that occurred every
year before the intervention; β2 was change in the outcome variable immediately after the
intervention (intercept changes); β3 estimated yearly change in outcome variable
compared with trend before the intervention (slope changes). Thus, sum of β1 and β3 was
the post-intervention slope.
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Table 2.
Example Data Format for ITS Analysis
Year

Prescribing rate

Time (T1t) Intervention

(Yt)

Time after intervention

(It)

(T2t)

2007

125.2

1

0

0

2008

136.5

2

0

0

2009

131.8

3

0

0

2010

133.3

4

0

0

2011

130.8

5

0

0

2012

114.3

6

1

1

2013

96.8

7

1

2

2014

95.5

8

1

3

2015

88.5

9

1

4

2016

83.4

10

1

5

2017

76.5

11

1

6

Analysis Methods for Objective 2
Research question 1g. Is there a statistically significant relationship between
prescribing rates and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates?
Objective 2 was to determine the relationships between the two mortality
measures (mortality of opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) and
prescribing rate. ARIMA models with mortality of opioids and mortality of heroin and
synthetic opioids as the dependent variables and prescribing rate as the independent
variable were performed.
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Assumptions of Time-Series Analysis
For each analysis performed, the following assumptions of time-series analysis
were examined (Yaffee and McGee, 2000; Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013).
•

Normality of residuals: Normality of the residuals was checked using the ShapiroWilk normality tests. The Shapiro–Wilk test examines the null hypothesis that a
sample came from a normally distributed population (Moore et al., 2009). A p
value less than 0.05 indicates that the null hypothesis should be rejected and there
is enough evidence to claim that the data tested are not from a normally
distributed population, i.e., the data are not normal. On the contrary, if the p value
is greater than 0.05, then the null hypothesis that the data came from a normally
distributed population cannot be rejected, and hence there is not enough evidence
to claim that the data tested are not from a normally distributed population, i.e.,
the data are normal.

•

Homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals: Plots of standardized
residuals versus predicted values were used to assess homogeneity of variance
over time. This assumption would be satisfied if the data points were randomly
distributed around the 0-horizontal line.

•

Independence of residuals: ACFs and PACFs for the residuals were used to
examine this assumption. Once the model is developed and residuals are
computed, there should be no remaining autocorrelations or partial
autocorrelations at various lags in the ACFs and PACFs. The Ljung-Box Q (LBQ)
statistics were used to test the null hypothesis that autocorrelations up to lag k
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equal zero (that is, the data values are random and independent up to a certain
number of lags). In addition, figures of the ACFs and the PACFS were checked to
ensure that all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95% confidence bounds (an
indication of no significant autocorrelations or partial autocorrelations)
If any of the assumptions were violated, different ARIMA models (ex:
ARIMA (1,1,0)) were performed, and results were examined and compared to the
initial ARIMA (0,1,0) model. For any analysis, a p value less than 0.05 was
considered significant.
Analysis Results
Figures 4-6 are the plots of the three study variables, including, prescribing rate,
mortality of opioids, and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids, between 2007 and
2017. For prescribing rate, the mean seemed edging downwards, whereas for the two
mortality measures, the means seemed going upwards. As the mean was changing for
each variable, the series may not be stationary, and the trend may be removed by
differencing.
Table 3 and Figures 7-9 present the ACFs and PACFs for the three time series
variables. For prescribing rate, the autocorrelation diminished gradually; for mortality of
opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids, the autocorrelation demonstrated
some fluctuation over time. These may be indications that the series were not stationary.
Based on the results of sequence plots, ACFs, and PACFs, all three series were
differenced once (d = 1) to remove the trend.
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Figure 4. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (The dash line represents the occurrence
of the intervention).
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Figure 5. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (The dash line represents the
occurrence of the intervention).
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Figure 6. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (The dash line
represents the occurrence of the intervention).
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Table 3.
ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables
Box-Ljung Statistic
Value df
p
Partial
SE
autocorrelation
1 1
.781
.302 8.725 1
.003
.781
.302
2
.502
.449 12.732 2
.002
-.277
.302
3
.222
.498 13.616 3
.003
-.173
.302
4
-.063
.507 13.696 4
.008
-.247
.302
5
-.354
.507 16.690 5
.005
-.326
.302
6
-.467
.529 22.916 6
.001
.154
.302
7
-.423
.566 29.313 7
.000
.132
.302
8
-.346
.594 35.022 8
.000
-.105
.302
9
-.254
.612 39.618 9
.000
-.117
.302
2 1
.416
.302 2.477 1
.115
.416
.302
2
.089
.350 2.604 2
.272
-.102
.302
3
.050
.352 2.648 3
.449
.063
.302
4
-.193
.353 3.406 4
.492
-.283
.302
5
.093
.362 3.613 5
.606
.393
.302
6
.075
.364 3.773 6
.707
-.256
.302
7
-.209
.366 5.330 7
.620
-.133
.302
8
-.190
.376 7.045 8
.532
-.177
.302
9
-.351
.385 15.864 9
.070
-.140
.302
3 1
.547
.302 4.272 1
.039
.547
.302
2
.201
.381 4.914 2
.086
-.140
.302
3
.054
.391 4.966 3
.174
.007
.302
4
.026
.391 4.979 4
.289
.024
.302
5
-.123
.391 5.340 5
.376
-.208
.302
6
-.229
.395 6.841 6
.336
-.096
.302
7
-.262
.407 9.297 7
.232
-.096
.302
8
-.281
.422 13.063 8
.110
-.146
.302
9
-.262
.439 17.954 9
.036
-.062
.302
Note: For DV (dependent variable), 1 = Prescribing rate, 2 = Mortality of opioids, and 3 =
DV Lag Autocorrelation SE

Mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids. SE = standard error, df = degrees of freedom, p
= p value.
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Figure 7. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate.

Figure 8. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids.

Figure 9. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids.
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Table 4 presents the three measures of the study (original scale and lag 1
differences). Figures 10-12 are the plots of the lag 1 differences of the three study
variables, including, prescribing rate, mortality of opioids, and mortality of heroin and
synthetic opioids, against time. The three measures appeared to be more stationary with
respect to central tendency after lag 1 differencing. Table 5 and Figures 13-15 present the
ACFs and PACFs for the lag 1 differences for the three time series variables. For all three
variables, the autocorrelations were fairly small and insignificant. For the prescribing
rate, the autocorrelation values ranged from a low of -.311 at lag 5 to a high of .139 at lag
1. For the mortality of prescription opioids, the autocorrelation values ranged from a low
of -.496 at lag 4 to a high of .209 at lag 5. For the mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids, the autocorrelation values ranged from -.294 at lag 7 to a high of .471 at lag 1.
Thus, we concluded that the data were stationary after differencing once (d = 1).
The results of the ACFs and PACFs for the lag 1 differences of the three measures
(Figures 13-15) were also used to determine if potential patterns are present in the data
for the autoregressive process and the moving average process. As there were no obvious
spikes or exponentially declining in the ACFs and PACFs for all three measures, it may
be reasonable to set p = 0 and q = 0 for the initial ARIMA models. In other words, an
ARIMA (0, 1, 0) model was identified as the initial best fitting ARIMA model for each
dependent series in this study. The results for identifying the ARIMA processes using the
Expert Modeler modeling procedure in SPSS confirmed the choice of the ARIMA (0, 1,
0) as the initial model for further data analysis.
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Table 4.
Data of the Study (Original Scale and Lag 1 Differences)
Prescribing rate

Mortality of
opioids
Year Original Lag 1
Original Lag 1
value
difference value
differe
nce
2007 125.2
.
0
.
2008 136.5
11.3
11
11
2009 131.8
-4.7
18
7
2010 133.3
1.5
19
1
2011 130.8
-2.5
52
33
2012 114.3
-16.5
41
-11
2013 96.8
-17.5
34
-7
2014 95.5
-1.3
39
5
2015 88.5
-7
27
-12
2016 83.4
-5.1
54
27
2017 76.5
-6.9
69
15
Note: Lag 1 difference was computed as “Yt - Yt-1.”

Mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids
Original value Lag 1 difference

0
0
0
0
12
37
62
39
87
177
275

.
0
0
0
12
25
25
-23
48
90
98
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Figure 10. Sequence of prescribing rate over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line
represents the occurrence of the intervention).

Figure 11. Sequence of mortality of opioids over time (Lag 1 differences) (The dash line
represents the occurrence of the intervention).
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Figure 12. Sequence of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids over time (Lag 1
differences) (The dash line represents the occurrence of the intervention).
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Table 5.
ACFs and PACFs for the Three Time Series Variables (Lag 1 Differences)

DV Lag Autocorrelation SE

Box-Ljung statistic
Value
df p

Partial
SE
autocorrelation
1
1
.139
.316 .256
1
.613
.139
.316
2
-.019
.322 .262
2
.877
-.039
.316
3
-.024
.322 .272
3
.965
-.017
.316
4
-.231
.323 1.340
4
.855
-.231
.316
5
-.311
.339 3.663
5
.599
-.267
.316
6
.082
.366 3.865
6
.695
.151
.316
7
-.076
.368 4.096
7
.769
-.142
.316
8
-.007
.370 4.098
8
.848
-.032
.316
2
1
-.254
.316 .859
1
.354
-.254
.316
2
-.083
.336 .964
2
.618
-.158
.316
3
.087
.338 1.094
3
.778
.025
.316
4
-.496
.340 6.006
4
.199
-.523
.316
5
.209
.406 7.054
5
.217
-.078
.316
6
.040
.417 7.102
6
.312
-.099
.316
7
-.059
.417 7.243
7
.404
-.074
.316
8
.040
.418 7.339
8
.501
-.356
.316
3
1
.471
.316 2.953
1
.086
.471
.316
2
-.024
.380 2.962
2
.227
-.315
.316
3
-.169
.380 3.449
3
.327
-.007
.316
4
.061
.387 3.523
4
.474
.229
.316
5
-.017
.388 3.530
5
.619
-.312
.316
6
-.138
.388 4.104
6
.663
.018
.316
7
-.294
.393 7.556
7
.373
-.223
.316
8
-.255
.415 11.444 8
.178
-.143
.316
Note: For DV (dependent variable), 1 = Prescribing rate, 2 = Mortality of opioids, and 3 =
Mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids. SE = standard error, df = degrees of freedom, p
= p value.
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Figure 13. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for prescribing rate (Lag 1
differences).

Figure 14. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of opioids (Lag 1
differences).
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Figure 15. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids (Lag 1 differences).

Analysis Results for Objective 1
ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate
Table 6 shows the results of ITS analysis of prescribing rate. The R2 = 0.957,
indicating that approximately 95.7% of the total variation in the series could be explained
by the model. The term for baseline trend (β1) indicated that before the intervention, there
was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 differences of prescribing
rate (Yt-Yt-1) (p = 0.231). The term for level change after intervention (β2), indicated that
immediately following the intervention, the lag 1 difference of prescribing rate (Yt-Yt-1)
did not change significantly (p = 0.127). The term for trend changes after intervention
(β3) indicated that there was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1
differences of prescribing rate (Yt-Yt-1), comparing to trend before the intervention (p =
0.102).
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The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (Figures 16-17 and
Table 7). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test
and the assumption was satisfied (W (10) = 0.982, p = 0.973). The assumption of
homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals was checked using the plot of
standardized residuals versus predicted values (see Figure 16) and was satisfied as the
data points were randomly distributed around the 0-horizontal line. The assumption of
independence of residuals was evaluated using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (Table
7 and Figure 17) and was satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were not
significant (p > 0.05, Table 7), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95%
confidence bounds (Figure 17).

Table 6.
Results of ITS Analysis of Prescribing Rate
Coefficient

SE

t

p

Intercept (β0)

13.720

9.712

1.413

.207

Baseline trend (β1)

-3.520

2.643

-1.332

.231

Level change after intervention (β2)

-13.120

7.398

-1.774

.127

2.997

1.932

.102

Trend change after intervention (β3) 5.791

Note: An ARIMA (0, 1, 0) model was employed. R2 = 0.957. SE = standard error, t = t
statistic, p = p value.
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Figure 16. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values.

Table 7.
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals

Lag Autocorrelation SE

Box-Ljung statistic
Value
df p

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

1.942
2.275
2.337
4.324
8.220
8.834
8.874
10.123

-.382
-.149
-.060
.315
-.403
.143
-.032
.144

.316
.359
.365
.366
.393
.432
.437
.437

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.163
.321
.506
.364
.145
.183
.262
.256

Partial
autocorrelation
-.382
-.345
-.356
.095
-.383
-.168
-.299
-.208

SE
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
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Figure 17. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals.

ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids
Table 8 shows the results of ITS analysis of mortality of opioids, with ARIMA
(1,1,1) modeling. Appendix A shows the ARIMA models that were fit but deemed
inappropriate due to violation of model assumptions. The R2 = 0.859, indicating that
approximately 85.9% of the total variation in the series could be explained by the model.
The term for baseline trend (β1) indicated that before the intervention, there was no
significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 difference of mortality of opioids (YtYt-1) (p = 0.277). The term for level change after intervention (β2), indicated that
immediately following the intervention, the lag 1 difference of mortality of opioids (Yt-Yt1)

significantly dropped by 40.033 (p = 0.043). The term for trend change after

intervention (β3) indicated that there was no significant year-to-year change in terms of
the lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids (Yt-Yt-1), comparing to trend before the
intervention (p = 0.960).
The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (Figures 18-19 and
Table 9). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk normality test
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and the assumption was satisfied (W (10) = 0.655, p = 0.078). The assumption of
homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals was checked using the plot of
standardized residuals versus predicted values (see Figure 18) and was satisfied as the
data points were randomly distributed around the 0-horizontal line. The assumption of
independence of residuals was evaluated using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (see
Table 9 and Figure 10) and was satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were
not significant (p > 0.05, Table 9), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95%
confidence bounds (see Figure 19).

Table 8.
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids
Coefficient SE

t

p

Intercept (β0)

-8.619

16.811

-.513

.635

Baseline trend (β1)

5.971

4.750

1.257

.277

Level change after intervention (β2)

-40.033

13.676

-2.927

.043

4.135

.053

.960

Trend change after intervention (β3) .220

Note: An ARIMA(1, 1, 1) model was employed. R2 = 0.859. SE = standard error, t = t
statistic, p = p value.
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Figure 18. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values.
Table 9.
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals

Lag Autocorrelation SE

Box-Ljung statistic
Value
df
p

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.200
2.471
2.992
3.174
7.405
7.440
9.425
9.461

-.122
-.389
-.174
-.095
.420
.034
-.223
.025

.316
.321
.365
.373
.376
.420
.420
.432

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.655
.291
.393
.529
.192
.282
.224
.305

Partial
autocorrelation
-.122
-.410
-.356
-.528
-.044
-.254
-.269
-.118

SE
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
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Figure 19. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals.

ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids
Table 10 shows the results of ITS analysis of mortality of heroin and synthetic
opioids, with ARIMA (2,1,0) modeling. Appendix B shows the ARIMA models that were
fit but deemed inappropriate due to violation of model assumptions. The R2 = 0.970,
indicating that approximately 97.0% of the total variation in the series could be explained
by the model. The term for baseline trend (β1) indicated that before the intervention, there
was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the lag 1 difference of mortality of
heroin and synthetic opioids (Yt-Yt-1) (p = 0.139). The term for level change after
intervention (β2), indicated that immediately following the intervention, the lag 1
difference of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids (Yt-Yt-1) did not change
significantly (p = 0.372). The term for trend changes after intervention (β3) indicated that
there was no significant year-to-year change in terms of the mortality of heroin and
synthetic opioids (Yt-Yt-1), comparing to trend before the intervention (p = 0.472).
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The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (see Figures 20-21
and Table 11). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk normality
test and the assumption was satisfied (W(10) = 0.970, p = 0.890). The assumption of
homogeneity of variance and zero mean of residuals was checked using the plot of
standardized residuals versus predicted values (Figure 20) and was satisfied as the data
points were randomly distributed around the 0 horizontal line. The assumption of
independence of residuals was evaluated using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (see
Table 11 and Figure 21) and was satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were
not significant (p > 0.05, Table 11), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95%
confidence bounds (see Figure 21).

Table 10.
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Heroin and Synthetic Opioids
Coefficient

SE

t

p

Intercept (β0)

-30.924

39.598

-.781

.470

Baseline trend (β1)

10.673

10.884

.981

.372

Level change after intervention (β2)

-50.443

28.698

-1.758

.139

Trend change after intervention (β3)

8.349

10.749

.777

.472

Note: An ARIMA(2, 1, 0) model was employed. ).” = 0.970. SE = standard error, t = t
statistic, p = p value.
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Figure 20. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values.

Table 11.
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals

Lag

Autocorrelation SE

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

-.384
-.179
-.011
-.007
.231
-.150
.022
-.067

.316
.360
.369
.369
.369
.383
.389
.389

Box-Ljung statistic
Value
df p
1.970
2.453
2.455
2.456
3.735
4.407
4.427
4.694

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.160
.293
.483
.652
.588
.622
.730
.790

Partial
autocorrelation
-.384
-.384
-.350
-.395
-.086
-.161
-.013
-.086

SE
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
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Figure 21. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals.

Analysis Results of Objective 2
Objective 2 was to determine the relationships between the two mortality
measures (mortality of opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids) and
prescribing rate. ARIMA(0, 0, 0) models with lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids
and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids as the dependent variables and lag 1
differences of prescribing rate as the independent variable were performed.
Figures 22 and 23 present the scatter plots of lag 1 differences of mortality of
opioids and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids, and lag 1 differences of prescribing
rate. Table 12 presents the results of bivariate time-series analyses. It appeared that there
was no statistically significant relationship between prescribing rate (in terms of lag 1
differences of prescribing rate) and mortality of opioids (in terms of lag 1 differences of
mortality of opioids) (t = 1.338, p = 0.218). There was also no statistically significant
relationship between prescribing rate (in terms of lag 1 differences of prescribing rate)
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and mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids (in terms of lag 1 differences of mortality of
heroin and synthetic opioids) (t = -0.982, p = 0.355).
The assumptions of the time-series analysis were examined (see Figures 24-27
and Tables 13-14). Normality of the residuals was checked using the Shapiro-Wilk
normality test and the assumption was satisfied for both models (W(10) = 0.900, p =
0.220; W(10) = 0.856, p = 0.068). The assumption of homogeneity of variance and zero
mean of residuals was checked using the plot of standardized residuals versus predicted
values (see Figures 24-25) and was satisfied as the data points were randomly distributed
around the 0 horizontal line. The assumption of independence of residuals was evaluated
using ACFs and PACFs of the residuals (see Table 14 and Figures 26-27) and was
satisfied as 1) all results of the Ljung-Box Q tests were not significant (p > 0.05, Table
14), and 2) all ACFs and PACFs were within the 95% confidence bounds (see Figures
26-27).
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Figure 22. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids and lag 1 differences of
prescribing rate.

Figure 23. scatter plot of lag 1 differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids
and lag 1 differences of prescribing rate.
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Table 12.
Results of Bivariate Analyses

Lag 1 differences of

R2

Coefficient SE

t

Intercept (β0)

10.699

5.411

1.977 .083 0.183

Slope (β1)

.780

.583

1.338 .218

Intercept (β0)

19.835

14.873 1.334 .219 0.108

Slope (β1)

-1.574

1.603

DV

p

mortality of opioids

Lag 1 differences of
mortality of heroin and
synthetic opioids

-.982

.355 1.574

Note: Two ARIMA(0, 0, 0) models were employed. R2 = 0.970. SE = standard error, t = t
statistic, p = p value.

Table 13.
Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests
DV

W

df

p

Lag 1 differences of mortality of

.900

10

.220

.856

10

.068

opioids
Lag 1 differences of mortality of
heroin and synthetic opioids
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Figure 24. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of
mortality of opioids).

Figure 25. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (DV = Lag 1 differences of
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids).
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Table 14.
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals

DV

Lag

Autocorrelation

Box-Ljung statistic
SE
Value df p

Partial
autocorrelation
1
1
-.292
.316
1.133
1
.287
-.292
2
-.036
.342
1.153
2
.562
-.132
3
-.148
.342
1.528
3
.676
-.221
4
-.301
.349
3.334
4
.504
-.497
5
.370
.374
6.623
5
.250
.038
6
.032
.409
6.655
6
.354
.074
7
.024
.409
6.678
7
.463
-.028
8
-.102
.409
7.301
8
.505
-.129
2
1
.540
.316
3.895
1
.058
.540
2
-.008
.398
3.896
2
.143
-.424
3
-.254
.398
5.002
3
.172
-.033
4
-.122
.414
5.300
4
.258
.146
5
-.091
.418
5.498
5
.358
-.289
6
-.176
.419
6.424
6
.377
-.099
7
-.226
.427
8.474
7
.293
-.037
8
-.153
.439
9.877
8
.274
-.120
Note: DV 1 = Lag 1 differences of mortality of opioids, 2 = Lag 1 differences of
mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids.

SE
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
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Figure 26. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1
differences of mortality of opioids).

Figure 27. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (DV = Lag 1
differences of mortality of heroin and synthetic opioids).
Summary
A brief summary of the findings for each research questions is outlined. Research
questions 1a through 1c were answered with a simple review of the data for each
category: prescribing rates, arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids, and
arrests rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids. Research questions 1d
through 1g were answered through interrupted time series analyses.
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According to the CDC (n.d.) prescribing rate maps, opioid prescribing rates in
Jefferson County, Kentucky did decrease after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1. The
prescribing rate decreased from 130.8 prescriptions per 100 U.S. citizens in 2011 to 114.3
prescriptions per 100 U.S. citizens in 2012. Using these statistics, it is clear that some
patients received multiple opioid prescriptions throughout each year. The prescribing rate
in Jefferson County, KY continued to decrease after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 to
96.8 prescriptions per 100 U.S. citizens in 2013. The prescribing rates continued to
decrease, although not as dramatically, from 2013 through 2017. In the context of this
study, this decrease in prescriptions would indicate a decrease in the supply of
prescription opioids. It should be noted that prescribing rates had begun a slight decrease
prior to the passage of HB1.
As per LMPD (n.d.) arrest data, the arrest rates for possession of heroin and
synthetic opioids did increase. The arrest rate climbed from 107 arrests in 2011 to 436
arrests in 2012. The arrest rate continued to climb after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1 in
2012 to 792 arrests in 2013. The arrest rate continued to climb, peaking in 2016 at 1381
arrests for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids. The arrest rate dropped in 2017 to
1237 arrests. In the context of this study, the increase in arrest rates seems to indicate an
increase in demand for heroin and synthetic opioids after the passage of Kentucky’s HB1
in 2012. It could be argued that the increase in arrests could is the result of aggressive law
enforcement actions. The simultaneous decrease in opioid prescriptions, resulting in
fewer opioids available for diversion, considered along with the simultaneous increase in
arrests for trafficking in heroin and synthetic opioids, leads this researcher to believe that
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demand for heroin and synthetic opioids increased. Put another way, as there were fewer
prescription opioids available to dealers and addicts, addicts began to demand more
heroin and synthetic opioids. Using the statistics for arrests for trafficking in heroin and
synthetic opioids, it seems apparent that drug dealers were ready to meet the supply for
this new demand. It should be noted that arrest rates for possession of heroin and
synthetic opioids had begun to climb prior to the passage of HB1.
As per LMPD (n.d.) arrest data, the arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and
synthetic opioids did increase. Arrest rates increased from 46 arrests in 2011 to 147
arrests in 2012. Arrest rates continued to increase with 280 arrests in 2013. In the context
of this study, the increase in arrests for trafficking in heroin and synthetic opioids
indicates an increase in supply of heroin and synthetic opioids. Again, it could be argued
that the increase in arrests could is the result of aggressive law enforcement actions. The
simultaneous decrease in opioid prescriptions, resulting in fewer opioids available for
diversion, considered along with the simultaneous increase in arrests for possession of
heroin and synthetic opioids, leads this researcher to believe that supply of heroin and
synthetic opioids increased. Put another way, this researcher believes that as there were
fewer prescription opioids available to dealers, defined by the decrease in opioid
prescriptions, dealers increased their supply of heroin and synthetic opioids to meet the
demands of local opioid addicts. It should be noted that arrest rates for trafficking of
heroin and synthetic opioids had begun to increase prior to the passage of HB1.
An ARIMA model (0, 1, 0) was employed and it was determined that there were
no significant changes in prescribing rates after the implementation of HB1. 95.7% of the
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data variation can be explained by the model. This finding indicates that the
implementation of HB1 had no significant effect prescribing rates in Jefferson County,
KY.
An ARIMA model (1, 1, 1) was employed and it was determined that there was a
significant decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatality rates immediately after the
implementation of HB1. 85.9% of the data variation can be explained by the model. This
finding indicates that the implementation of HB1 had an immediate effect, decreasing the
prescription opioid overdose rate in Jefferson County, KY.
An ARIMA model (2, 1, 0) was employed and it was determined that there was
no significant change in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates after the
implementation of HB1. 97.0% of the data variation can be explained by the model. This
finding indicates that HB1 had no effect on the overdose fatality rates for heroin and
synthetic opioids.
An ARIMA model (0, 0, 0) was employed and it was determined that there was
no significant relationship between prescribing rates and heroin and synthetic opioid
overdose fatality rates in this study. In the following chapter, I provide the interpretation,
recommendations, and implications of the current study.
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Chapter 5: Interpretation, Recommendations, and Implications
Introduction
The research questions were designed to inquire about the state of supply and
demand for prescription opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids in Jefferson County,
Kentucky after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. The supply of prescription
opioids was studied using data from the CDC’s (n.d.) prescribing rate maps and LMPD’s
arrest records for trafficking of opioids. The demand for prescription opioids and heroin
and synthetic opioids was studied using LMPD’s (n.d.) arrest records for possession of
opioids and heroin and synthetic opioids. Precisely, this study was concerned with the
goal of determining whether or not the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 created an
environment in which prescription opioid misusers made a rational choice to switch to
heroin and synthetic opioid use. Such a switch to an unregulated, and more dangerous,
illicit market drug would be expected to result in significant increases in opioid overdose
fatalities overall. Thus, the ultimate goal of this study was to discover and quantify any
relationships between the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 and the documented
increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates.
Key Findings
There were multiple key findings for this study. Research question 1a asked if
prescribing rates decreased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. This question
was designed to be a measure of the supply of prescription opioids both before and after
the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. As can be seen in Figure 1, prescribing rates had
begun to moderately decrease prior to the implementation of HB1 in 2012. However, a
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dramatic decrease in prescribing rates was seen in 2012, the year in which Kentucky’s
HB1 was implemented, and the decrease continued through 2017. Prescribing rates
decreased after the implementation of HB1. A decrease in prescription opioid rates was
interpreted to mean that the supply of prescription opioids had decreased and that, as a
consequence, there would have been fewer prescription opioids available for diversion to
the illicit opioid market.
Research question 1b asked whether arrest rates for possession of heroin and
synthetic opioids increased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. Given the
decrease in opioid prescription rates, it was theorized that the demand for heroin and
synthetic opioids would increase because they would be used as replacement opioids. As
can be seen in Figure 2, arrest rates for heroin and synthetic opioids increased moderately
between 2007 and 2011. Arrest rates for possession of heroin and synthetic opioids
dramatically increased in 2012 and continued to increase through 2016. Arrests rates for
possession of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after the implementation of
Kentucky’s HB1 in 2012. An increase in arrest rates for possession of heroin and
synthetic opioids was interpreted as an increase in the demand for the illicitly
manufactured drugs.
Research question 1c asked whether trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids
increased after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. Arrest rates for trafficking of
heroin and synthetic opioids had moderately increased from 2007 through 2011. As can
be seen in Figure 3, arrest rates increased dramatically in 2012 and continued to climb
through 2016. Arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and synthetic opioids increased after
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the implementation of HB1. An increase in arrest rates for trafficking of heroin and
synthetic opioids was interpreted as an increase in supply of heroin and synthetic opioids.
Research questions 1a through 1c were intended to explore the aspects of supply
and demand. The answers to research questions 1a through 1c indicate that there was a
decrease in the supply of prescription opioids and a simultaneous increase in both supply
and demand for heroin and synthetic opioids. These findings were consistent with the
hypothesis that the implementation of HB1 could have created a supply and demand
environment in which prescription opioid addicts might have made a rational choice to
switch to heroin and synthetic opioid use.
Research question 1d asked if there is a statistically significant difference in the
prescription opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of HB1. As can be
seen in Table 1, the opioid prescribing rate in Jefferson County, Kentucky remained
somewhat stable between 2007 and 2011. Then in 2012, the year that HB1 was
implemented, the prescribing rate began a continuous decrease through 2017. An
interrupted time series study was conducted to determine the significance of the decrease.
Interrupted time series analysis indicated that the trajectory of opioid prescribing rates did
not significantly change as a direct result of the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1.
Although prescribing rates did decrease, consistent with the goal of HB1, the decrease
was not a direct result of the implementation of HB1. This finding also indicates any
decrease in the supply of prescription opioids was not a direct result of the
implementation of HB1.
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Research question 1e asked if there is a statistically significant difference in the
prescription opioid overdose fatality rate after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1.
As can be seen in Table 1, the mortality rate or prescription opioids trended downward
for the first four years after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. After the initial
downward trend, however, mortality rates began to climb again in 2016. An interrupted
time series study was conducted to determine any significance of the relationship
between HB1 and the decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatality incidents. An
interrupted time series analysis indicated that the relationship between the downward
trajectory of prescription opioid overdose fatalities and the implementation of Kentucky’s
HB1 was significantly significant. This finding is consistent with the goals of HB1.
Research question 1f asked if there is a statistically significant difference in the
heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rate after the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1.
As can be seen in Table 1, the mortality rate for heroin and synthetic opioid overdose was
zero for the years of 2007 through 2010. In 2011, heroin and synthetic opioid overdose
became an issue in Jefferson County, Kentucky. Beginning with 12 overdose fatalities in
2011, the heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rate continuously climbed each
year to 275 overdose fatalities in 2017. An interrupted time series study was conducted to
determine the significance of the increase to the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1.
Although overdose fatality rates for heroin and synthetic opioids did increase after the
implementation of HB1, interrupted time series analysis indicated that the increase was
not significantly related to the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1.
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Finally, research question 1g asked if there is a statistically significant
relationship between prescribing rates and heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality
rates. It can be seen in Table 1 that there was a decrease in opioid prescribing rates and a
simultaneous increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates. An interrupted time
series study was conducted to determine the significance of a possible relationship.
Interrupted time series analysis indicated that the decrease in opioid prescribing rates was
not significantly related to either the decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatality
rates or the increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates after the
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. This finding is inconsistent with the overall
hypothesis that the implementation of HB1 had a causal effect on the increase in heroin
and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities.
Interpretation of the Findings
Public policy is expected to have consequences. The intended consequence of
HB1 was that there would be a decrease in opioid prescriptions resulting in fewer
prescription drugs available for diversion to the illicit market (Kentucky General
Assembly, 2012). This intended consequence was expected lead to a reduction in
overdose incidents. HB1 was intended to address all prescription drug overdose incidents.
Opioids are a special class of prescription drugs in that there are illicit options to fulfill an
addict’s needs. Heroin and illicitly produced synthetic opioids have traditionally filled the
needs of addicts who cannot obtain regulated prescription opioids (Alpert et al., 2017;
Cicero et al., 2014; Mars et al., 2014).
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Unintended consequences of public policy are not always easy to predict. A study
by Alpert et al., (2017) found that oxycontin addicts switched to heroin use as a result of
a change in the oxycontin formula that made the drug more difficult to crush and use
illicitly. I was concerned with the same type of unintended consequence as a result of the
implementation of Kentucky’s HB1. Specifically, I was concerned with identifying and
quantifying any possible relationships between the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1
and the documented increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose rates.
A reduction in prescriptions for opioids would mean that there were fewer
prescription opioids available for diversion to the illicit market. Heroin and synthetic
opioids can be manufactured in clandestine labs, thus bypassing the need for a doctor’s
prescription. These illicitly produced opioids can be marketed and used outside of the
reach of public policies concerning PDMPs. It was hypothesized in this study that if HB1
resulted in fewer opioid prescriptions, opioid addicts were forced to make a rational
choice: stop using opioids or seek out illicit alternatives. The hypothesis was not
reinforced by this study.
Although the supply of prescription opioids did decrease while the demand for
heroin and synthetic opioids increased, it does not appear that these findings were
consistent with any relationship to the implementation of HB1. The findings of research
questions 1a through 1c seem to indicate an environment in which a switch was made
from prescription opioid abuse to heroin and synthetic opioid use. However, further
findings for questions 1d, 1f, and 1g indicate that the environment was not induced by the
implementation of HB1. Kentucky’s HB1 does not seem to have created an environment
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in which opioid addicts were forced to make a rational choice to switch to heroin and
synthetic opioid use. Neither the reduction of opioid prescriptions nor the increase in
heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities was found to be significantly related to the
implementation of HB1.
The only significant relationship found in this study was between the
implementation of HB1 and the decrease in prescription opioid overdose fatalities. This
finding indicates that HB1 ultimately acted exactly as intended. The overall opioid
fatality rates increased dramatically when after the implementation of HB1 when
prescription opioids, heroin, and synthetic opioids are considered. However, HB1 was not
intended to affect heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatality rates, only prescription
opioid overdose fatality rates. Since the overall goal of HB1 was to decrease the rate of
prescription opioid overdose fatalities, HB1 could be considered a successful policy
implementation. This study hypothesized that although the prescription opioid overdose
fatality rate deceased, the overall opioid rate increased as a result of the implementation
of Kentucky’s HB1. Had this been the case, HB1 would have ultimately been considered
a failure for creating an environment in which more people ultimately died of opioid
overdose. The results of this study do not find that this is the case. There was no
relationship found between the implementation of HB1 and the rate of heroin and
synthetic opioid overdose rates. Again, Kentucky’s HB1 should be considered a
successful policy implementation.
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Limitations
The major limitation for quasi-experimental designs is that there is no control
group by which to compare actual results. The assumptions for interrupted time series
studies are normality of the residuals, homogeneity of variance and zero mean of
residuals, and independence of residuals. Results of this study rely on these assumptions.
Further limitations include a human error and a lack of complete data for LMPD
arrest records. All computer databases are susceptible to human error. Arresting officers
input data concerning arrest charges. It would stand to reason that there might be some
individual practices for inputting data and that this individualism might lead to
inconsistencies. For example, some data in the LMPD arrest records includes arrests for
generic controlled substance statutes that do not identify the drug seized. LMPD records
include generic charges for possession of a controlled substance and trafficking of a
controlled substance. It could be inferred that some of these arrests include arrests for
opioids. However, none of these statistics could be used in this study due to a lack of
identification of drug type possessed or trafficked by the arrestee.
Recommendations
Future Policy Indications
This study adds to the body of knowledge proclaiming success for PDMPs (CDC,
2017; Finklea et al., 2014; Gau & Brooke, 2017; Kentucky General Assembly, 2012). In
addition to previous academic and organizational claims of success for PDMPs, future
policymakers should add the current findings to research encouraging the implementation
of PDMPs. If future research can determine the reason(s) behind increases in heroin and
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synthetic opioid overdose rates, likely cost and purity of the drugs, then policy
considerations should be made to combat the supply of these drugs (Alpert et al., 2017;
Cicero et al., 2014).
Future Research
Research by Alpert et al. (2017) and Cicero et al. (2014) indicate that drug price,
purity, and availability drive opioid addicts to make the switch to heroin and synthetic
opioids use. A review of the data from this study clearly shows a dramatic increase in
heroin and synthetic opioid overdose fatalities beginning near the implementation of
HB1. Although this study clearly absolves HB1 of any culpability for the increase,
something changed around the same time period to drive this shift in opioid abuse. Future
research could attempt to identify other sources for encouraging this change.
Naloxone has become more available within the last decade. Future research
testing relationships between naloxone and overdose rates could lead to a better
understanding of the drug meant to reverse opioid overdose incidents. During my
research for this study, I spoke to an emergency room nurse who explained that some
opioid overdose fatality incidents occurred after having been previously revived with
naloxone. She explained that when revived, the addict no longer feels the intoxicating
effects of the opioid, so they add more of the drug into their bodies. This addition can
lead to a second overdose and eventual fatality. Future research in this area could be
lifesaving.
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Implications
The current study has positive social implications at the individual, family, and
societal levels. First, individuals who are addicted to prescription opioids need access to
safer options. It appears that addicts have, for whatever reason, made a switch from
prescription opioids to the unregulated and more dangerous illicit opioids, heroin and
synthetic opioids. Foreseeing this need for options could lead to better policies with
stronger incentives to seek addiction treatment rather than continue down the path of
addiction.
In 2017, drug overdoses took more than 70,000 lives. 68% of those deaths were
opioid related (CDC, n.d.). This statistic has overwhelming implications at the family and
societal levels. Each opioid overdose death has implications at the family level because
each victim has family members who are affected by the epidemic. Each victim is
potentially leaving a mother, father, child, or many other family members to deal with the
emotional toll of their death.
It has been estimated that the opioid epidemic has cost the United States more
than one trillion dollars between the years 2001 and 2017 (Litton, 2018). This number
implies enormous societal implications for positive social change. The estimation clearly
indicates that the cost of the opioid epidemic is expensive to say the least. If an
appropriate portion of this expense could be directed toward encouraging opioid addicts
to receive treatment, rather than switch to heroin and synthetic opioids, we might see a
decline in overdose deaths. The overall implications for positive social change could be
measured in lives saved.
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Conclusion
This study was conducted to identify and quantify possible relationships between
the implementation of Kentucky’s HB1 and opioid overdose fatality rates. Kentucky’s
HB1 was intended to influence prescribing rates for all prescription drugs. After the
implementation of HB1, heroin and fentanyl overtook prescription opioids as the number
one drug identified in medical examiners’ overdose toxicology reports (Office of the
State Medical Examiner, n.d.). After HB1 was implemented, the supply and demand for
heroin and synthetic opioids appear to have increased. This was determined by studying
the arrest rates for trafficking and possession of heroin and synthetic opioids.
This study determined that HB1 ultimately acted as intended. Although the
prescribing rate in Jefferson County, Kentucky declined, the decrease was not found to be
directly related to the implementation Of HB1. However, the secondary, and most
important, intention of HB1 was realized. The decrease in prescription opioid overdose
fatalities was found to be directly related to the implementation of HB1.
To incite true positive social change, it must be recognized when public policy
encourages positive social results. HB1 appears to have been validated by this study. The
bill achieved the goal of saving lives. In addition to this recognition, however, it must be
admitted that there was still a dramatic increase in heroin and synthetic opioid overdose
rates in the past decade. Something encouraged this change. Researchers must not only
continue to search for the sources of the change, but also effective responses to the
change. It could be argued that finding the root cause of opioid abuse in specific
populations would point us in the right direction for finding solutions. 68% of more than
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70,000 drug overdose fatalities in 2017 were opioid related (CDC, n.d.). This statistic
demands further research and understanding of the opioid epidemic.
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Appendix A
For the ARIMA(0, 1, 0) model, a significant ACF was found in lag 1 (p = 0.047,
Table A3) and hence the assumption of independence of residuals was violated. For the
ARIMA(1,1,0) model, the normality assumption was violated (Table A2).

Table A1.
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids

ARIMA(0, 1, 0)

Coefficient

SE

Intercept (β0)

-8.000

21.091 -.379

Baseline trend (β1)

6.000

5.740

Level change after

-40.667

16.066 -

intervention (β2)
Trend change after

t

p

R2

.718 0.673

1.045 .336
.045

2.531
.143

6.509

.022

Intercept (β0)

-8.828

16.110 -.548

Baseline trend (β1)

5.826

4.433

Level change after

-37.672

12.253 -

.983

intervention (β3)
ARIMA(1, 1, 0)

intervention (β2)
Trend change after

.607 0.776

1.314 .246
.028

3.074
.139

4.602

intervention (β3)
Note: SE = standard error, t = t statistic, p = p value.

Table A2.
Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests
W

df

p

ARIMA(0, 1, 0)

0.953

10

0.699

ARIMA(1, 1, 0)

0.765

10

0.005

.030

.977
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Figure A1. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (ARIMA(0, 1, 0)).

Figure A2. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (ARIMA(1, 1, 0)).
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Table A3.
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals
Box-Ljung statistic

ARIMA
(0, 1, 0)

ARIMA
(1, 1, 0)

Lag
1

Autocorrelation SE
-.544
.316

Value df
3.944 1

p
.047

Partial
SE
autocorrelation
-.544
.316

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1

-.013
.087
-.241
.413
-.171
-.124
.116
-.254

.399
.399
.401
.415
.454
.461
.464
.316

3.947
4.077
5.239
9.330
10.207
10.820
11.621
.860

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1

.139
.253
.264
.097
.116
.147
.169
.354

-.439
-.285
-.624
-.332
-.186
-.240
-.257
-.254

.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

-.329
-.020
-.083
.424
-.078
-.268
.059

.336
.367
.367
.369
.415
.416
.433

2.481
2.488
2.626
6.944
7.125
9.990
10.198

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.289
.477
.622
.225
.309
.189
.251

-.420
-.319
-.506
.073
-.041
-.062
-.028

.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
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Figure A3. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (ARIMA(0, 1, 0)).

Figure A4. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (ARIMA(1, 1, 0)).
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Appendix B
For the ARIMA(0, 1, 0), ARIMA(1, 1, 0), ARIMA(1, 1, 1) models, the normality
assumption was violated (Table B2).

Table B1.
Results of ITS Analysis of Mortality of Opioids
Coefficient SE
ARIMA(0, 1, 0)

t

p

R2

Intercept (β0)

-9.600

45.567 -.211

.840 0.938

Baseline trend (β1)

3.600

12.402 .290

.781

Level change after

-27.667

34.710 -.797

.456

14.429

14.062 1.026 .344

Intercept (β0)

-8.809

50.566 -.174

.869 0.938

Baseline trend (β1)

3.314

13.739 .241

.819

Level change after

-26.408

38.619 -.684

.524

14.601

15.714 .929

.395

Intercept (β0)

-15.182

54.722 -.277

.795 0.947

Baseline trend (β1)

-.994

32.891 -.030

.977

Level change after

5.498

14.540 .378

.725

-37.993

40.013 -.950

.396

intervention (β2)
Trend change after
intervention (β3)
ARIMA(1, 1, 0)

intervention (β2)
Trend change after
intervention (β3)
ARIMA(1, 1, 1)

intervention (β2)
Trend change after
intervention (β3)
Note: SE = standard error, t = t statistic, p = p value.
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Table B2.
Results of Shapiro-Wilk Tests
W

df

p

ARIMA(0, 1, 0)

.788

10

.010

ARIMA(1, 1, 0)

.765

10

.005

ARIMA(1, 1, 1)

.791

10

.011

Figure B1. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (ARIMA(0, 1, 0)).
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Figure B2. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (ARIMA(1, 1, 0)).

Figure B3. Plot of standardized residuals and predicted values (ARIMA(1, 1, 1)).
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Table B3.
ACFs and PACFs for the Residuals

ARIMA
(0, 1, 0)

ARIMA
(1, 1, 0)

ARIMA
(1, 1, 1)

Box-Ljung statistic
Lag Autocorrelation SE
Value df

p

1

.040

.316

.021

1

.885

Partial
SE
autocorrelation
.040
.316

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1

-.611
-.166
.193
.091
-.042
-.017
.008
.029

.317
.418
.425
.433
.435
.436
.436
.316

5.620
6.093
6.836
7.035
7.087
7.098
7.102
.011

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1

.060
.107
.145
.218
.313
.419
.526
.915

-.613
-.165
-.289
-.212
-.203
-.166
-.175
.029

.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1

-.598
-.159
.183
.086
-.037
-.014
.007
-.116

.316
.414
.420
.428
.430
.430
.430
.316

5.381
5.814
6.483
6.660
6.702
6.710
6.713
.181

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1

.068
.121
.166
.247
.349
.460
.568
.671

-.600
-.177
-.283
-.215
-.203
-.167
-.174
-.116

.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

-.479
-.083
.146
.096
-.065
-.007
-.002

.320
.385
.387
.393
.395
.396
.396

3.620
3.738
4.166
4.386
4.513
4.515
4.515

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

.164
.291
.384
.495
.608
.719
.808

-.499
-.304
-.269
-.195
-.235
-.139
-.182

.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
.316
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Figure B4. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (ARIMA(0, 1, 0)).

Figure B5. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (ARIMA(1, 1, 0)).
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Figure B6. Figures of ACFs (right) and PACFs (left) for the residuals (ARIMA(1, 1, 1)).

